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I. INTRODUCTION 
ccountability is the “new black” of international governance.1 
Fears of cooptation of governance by non-state, and therefore in 
some scholars’ minds, non-legitimate, actors pervades the literature on 
accountability.2 This critique of non-governmental organizations’ 
(NGOs) participation in international governance regimes generally 
starts with the question: “Who elected the NGOs?”3 This is a fair ques-
tion to raise, but one which does not address the whole picture or norma-
tively invalidate NGO participation in all circumstances. 
The current debate and literature over-emphasizes democratic account-
ability to the possible detriment of other available means of ensuring ac-
countability in governance regimes.4 This Article posits the emphasis on 
elements such as elections and representativeness of governance actors 
as lone indicators of accountability is insufficient to justify participation 
                                                                                                             
 1. Governance is used throughout this Article in the narrow sense of governance 
with governmental involvement. See generally GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: 
ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (Ernst-Otto Czempiel & James Rosenau eds., 
1992) (discussing the broadening concept of governance beyond governments). It is 
therefore “a mode of governing that is distinct from the hierarchical control model char-
acterizing the interventionist state. Governance is the type of regulation typical of the 
cooperative state, where state and non-state actors participate in mixed public/private 
policy networks.”  Renate Mayntz, Common Goods and Governance, in COMMON 
GOODS: REINVENTING EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 15, 21 (Adrienne 
Heritier ed., 2002). This is sometimes referred to as a public-private partnership arrange-
ment, or “the formation of cooperative relationships between government, profit-making 
firms, and non-profit private organizations to fulfill a policy function.”  Stephen H. 
Linder & Pauline Vaillancourt Rosenau, Mapping the Terrain of the Public-Private Pol-
icy Partnership, in PUBLIC-PRIVATE POLICY PARTNERSHIPS 1, 5 (Pauline Vaillancourt 
Rosenau ed., 2000). As a result, global governance is “rule making and power exercise at 
a global scale . . . [and] can be exercised by states, religious organizations, and business 
corporations, as well as by intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.” 
Robert O. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, in TAMING 
GLOBALIZATION: FRONTIERS OF GOVERNANCE 130, 132 (David Held & Mathias Koenig-
Archibugi eds., 2003). 
 2. For the purposes of this Article, an NGO shall be defined in accordance with the 
United Nations’ definition which notes an NGO as “any non-profit voluntary citizens’ 
group which is organized on a local, national or international level.”  United Nations, 
http://www.un.org/dpi/ngosection/brochure.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2005). 
 3. Kenneth Anderson, The Limits of Pragmatism in American Foreign Policy: Unso-
licited Advice to the Bush Administration on Relations with International Nongovernmen-
tal Organizations, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 371, 379 (2001). 
 4. See Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in 
World Politics, AM. POL. SCI. REV., Feb. 2005, at 1. 
A 
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in international governance and fails to recognize the importance of 
delegation as another legitimate source of authority.5 
Most scholars treat NGOs as a homogenous group and base their theo-
retical and normative arguments around such a generalization, even when 
recognizing NGOs vary significantly on a number of levels.6 This Article 
seeks to advance the literature on NGO accountability by unpacking 
NGOs by functional role in international governance and relating these 
roles to accountability theory. Failing to recognize these functional dis-
tinctions, many theories of NGO participation in international govern-
                                                                                                             
 5. Robert O. Keohane, Political Accountability 14–17 (paper presented to Confer-
ence on Delegation to International Organizations, Park City, Utah, May 3–4, 2002); 
Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Democracy, Accountability and Global Govern-
ance 1 (Harvard Univ. Politics Research Group, Working Paper No. 01-4, 2001), avail-
able at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/prg/nye/ggajune.pdf; Robert E. Goodin, Democratic 
Accountability: The Third Sector and All 12 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Working 
Paper No. 19, 2003); Miles Kahler, Defining Accountability Up: The Global Economic 
Multilaterals (May 17–18, 2002) (working paper, presented at Miliband Conference on 
Global Governance and Public Accountability, London School of Economics) (arguing 
national governments have adequate institutional control over international institutions to 
which power is delegated). 
 6. Wide variations in NGOs’ purposes, sizes, competencies, functions, membership 
structures, and funding sources, for example, impact the effectiveness of accountability 
mechanisms and counsel for greater specificity in establishing accountability mecha-
nisms. For a discussion of some of these wide NGO variations, see, for example, Bene-
dict Kingsbury, First Amendment Liberalism as Global Legal Architecture: Ascriptive 
Groups and the Problems of the Liberal NGO Model of International Civil Society, 3 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 183, 186 (2002); S. Tarrow, Transnational Politics: Contention and Insti-
tutions in International Politics, 4 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 1 (2001) (noting sometimes 
NGOs are really state bodies in disguise to gain increased political influence); J.A. 
Scholte, Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance, 8 GOVERNANCE 281, 295–
99 (2002); Ngaire Woods, Global Governance and the Role of Institutions, in 
GOVERNING GLOBALIZATION 25, 28 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2002); John 
Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge, The Globalization Backlash, FOREIGN POL’Y, Sept.–
Oct. 2001, at 16 (“NGOs claim to represent global civil society. But nobody elects 
them.”); David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, The Rocky Shoals of International Law, 62 
NAT’L INTEREST 35, 37 (2001) (“NGOs are not elected, not accountable to any body poli-
tic.”); Jeremy Rabkin, International Law vs. the American Constitution—Something’s 
Got to Give, 55 NAT’L INTEREST 30, 37 (1999) (“NGOs never have to face voters or bear 
any sort of accountability.”). The variations are important because, for example, increas-
ing the openness or representativeness of governance structures may undermine account-
ability for nondecisions when deadlocks or “joint decision traps” occur (made more likely 
by the increased breadth of participation). See Fritz W. Scharpf, Coordination in Hierar-
chies and Networks, in GAMES IN HIERARCHIES AND NETWORKS: ANALYTICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS (Fritz W. Scharpf 
ed., 1993). 
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ance have missed the mark, focusing primarily on ensuring greater ac-
countability of NGOs generally. This Article seeks to remove the debate 
regarding the provision of accountability from the level of the actor to 
that of function.7  This Article proposes the participation of NGOs in in-
ternational governance should not always depend upon democratic ac-
countability. Instead, the accountability required of these NGOs should 
depend upon the particular governance function they perform. As a re-
sult, the mechanisms used to achieve such accountability will necessarily 
vary by function. 
Part II begins with a discussion of accountability in international gov-
ernance, establishing a general typology of accountability mechanisms.8 
Part III then describes some of the different functions performed by 
NGOs in international governance, providing examples of how such sys-
tems are arranged under existing frameworks and illustrating the rela-
tionship between the function performed and the accountability needed. 
Part IV seeks to refine NGO accountability theory by proposing a new 
model to guide NGO participation: one linking accountability to func-
tion. Part IV also identifies some concerns in implementing the theory. 
The Article concludes by calling for further research into the potential 
drawbacks of implementing this new framework so an appropriate bal-
ance between fairness, operability, and accountability may be reached in 
international governance. 
                                                                                                             
 7. While it may be argued the underlying assumption behind this framework is that 
it does not matter who governs, so long as appropriate accountability controls are en-
forced, this argument would be an over-extension of this Article’s proposal. This Article 
does not seek to undermine the authority of State actors in international governance, nor 
does it suggest States are losing power in international governance. Rather, it questions 
the assumption that accountability mechanisms must be differentiated between authority 
delegated to administrative government agencies and authority delegated to non-state 
actors with sufficient controls to assure adequate accountability to the delegator. It is 
beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate whether, after establishing a baseline ac-
countability requirement for a particular function, particular actors must be held to differ-
ent standards based upon different levels of legitimacy as international governance actors. 
Normatively, such a differentiation seems questionable, since accountability mechanisms 
are designed to constrain power, whatever its form. These actor-based legitimacy con-
cerns may better be dealt with through other forms of legitimization, rather than through 
accountability controls, but this Article does not take a position on this issue. 
 8. This categorization is based largely upon the work of Keohane, Grant, and Nye. 
See generally Grant & Keohane, supra note 4; Keohane & Nye, supra note 5. 
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II. ACCOUNTABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 
Although accountability is “an under-explored concept whose meaning 
remains evasive,”9 the purpose of this Article is not to define the concept 
with any more lucidity than theorists who have come before; instead, it is 
to explore a new mode of analysis for how accountability mechanisms 
should be structured. Generally, an “accountability system is the set of 
accountability mechanisms, and their interactions, that characterize a 
given governance system.”10 Accountability implies information and the 
ability to sanction power-wielders for misbehavior: “[a]ccountability re-
fers to relationships in which principals have the ability to demand an-
swers from agents to questions about their proposed or past behavior, to 
discern that behavior, and to impose sanctions on agents in the event that 
they regard the behavior as unsatisfactory.”11 Accountability is important 
in international governance because “to a greater degree than domestic 
lawmaking, the international process suffers from an accountability defi-
cit.”12 
A. Democratic Accountability 
Most theorists have defined and operationalized accountability by ref-
erence to democratic legitimacy, elections, and the sanction of removal 
as yardsticks of accountability and legitimacy.13 Democratic accountabil-
ity presumes the existence of a demos14 whose will can be measured. 
                                                                                                             
 9. Andreas Schedler, Conceptualizing Accountability, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING 
STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 13, 13 (Andreas Schedler et 
al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE]. 
 10. Keohane, Political Accountability, supra note 5, at 9. 
 11. Id. at 3. See also John Dunn, Situating Democratic Political Accountability, in 
DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 329, 335 (Adam Przeworski et al. 
eds., 1999). It is important to note the principals, or accountability holders, need not be 
the beneficiaries of the agents’ actions. 
 12. Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law—Legitimacy, Accountability, Au-
thority, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 COLO. L. REV. 1555, 1562 (1999). 
 13. This Article does not presume democratic legitimacy is the only or necessarily the 
appropriate form of legitimacy to which regimes and organizations should aspire. How-
ever, it is one of the norms discussed in this Article and representative accountability 
(often referred to as democratic accountability) is assumed throughout many of the dis-
cussions in this Article. 
 14. A demos is considered “a polity with members by . . . whom and for whom de-
mocratic discourse with its many variants takes place.”  J. H. H. Weiler, European Neo-
Constitutionalism: In Search of Foundations for the European Constitutional Order, 44 
POL. STUD. 517, 523 (1996). It has been referred to as “a sovereign authority that decides 
important political matters either directly in popular assemblies or indirectly through its 
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While the existence of an international demos is a matter of significant 
contention,15 some authors have suggested cross-border and international 
issue- and function-specific demoi do exist.16 Whether an international 
demos exists remains a debate. However, civil society registered its view 
on the matter in Seattle, proclaiming loudly through protests at the World 
Trade Organization meeting in 1999 that without abilities to relate civil 
society’s views to the governing bodies of international legal regimes, 
those regimes may become less legitimate.17 This has led some to con-
clude a “democracy deficit” exists, necessitating greater accountability.18 
This Article agrees democratic accountability may be important and nec-
essary to ensure the legitimacy of governance regimes, but believes the 
uniform requirement of democratic accountability to be excessive. In-
stead, this mode of accountability should be required only when func-
tions performed by NGOs relate to the representation of a particular 
populace. 
                                                                                                             
representatives.”  Robert A. Dahl, Can International Organizations be Democratic? A 
Skeptic’s View, in DEMOCRACY’S EDGES  20 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds., 
1999). 
 15. Compare PIPPA NORRIS, A VIRTUOUS CIRCLE: POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS IN 
POSTINDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES (2000) (generally arguing national identities are not suffi-
ciently global to support a representative global demos) with DAVID BEETHAM, 
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 137 (1999) (“[T]he demos that is democracy’s subject 
has come to be defined almost exclusively in national terms, and the scope of democratic 
rights has been limited to the bounds of the nation-state.”). 
 16. See Tanja Brühl, The Privatisation of International Environmental Governance, 
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2001 BERLIN CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND THE NATION 
STATE 371, 376–77 (Frank Biermann et al. eds., 2002), available at http://www. 
glogov.org/upload/public%20files/pdf/publications/bc%20proceedings/bc2001/bruhl.pdf. 
This is because a demos is defined by populations which, having a sense of trust and 
public spirit, engage in public discourse to recognize the existence of mutual rights and 
obligations of its members, reinforcing feelings of solidarity within the population. See 
Michael Zürn, Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State: The EU and Other 
International Institutions, 6 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 183, 195–200 (2000). 
 17. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 22. 
 18. E.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Limits of Globalization and the Future of Adminis-
trative Law: From Government to Governance, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 379 
(2001). Other authors have argued even democratic decisions at the State level are often 
no longer “democratic” in so far as they create externalities on neighboring States’ citi-
zens who had no opportunity to participate in the decision-making. See Daniele Archi-
bugi, Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy, in RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY: 
STUDIES IN COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 198, 204 (Daniele Archibugi et al. eds., 1998) 
[hereinafter RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY]; David Held, Democracy and Glob-
alisation, in RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY, supra at 11, 14. 
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Levels of internal democratic accountability vary significantly between 
NGOs,19 and some have argued “the role of NGOs is not to be represen-
tative but to raise awareness.”20 However, the vast majority of NGO ac-
countability scholars dealing with this issue evaluate NGO accountability 
based solely upon these internal controls.21 Their claim is NGO represen-
tatives generally are not elected by their memberships, and members 
typically are passive contributors who do not review or direct the NGOs’ 
actions.22 
However, this criticism of NGO democratic accountability tends to 
conflate internal and external accountability.23 The external democratic 
accountability charge is NGOs are only accountable to their membership, 
without allowing the beneficiaries a right to determine the NGO actions 
affecting them.24 However, both of these criticisms depend upon the 
norm of democracy to legitimate NGO involvement in international gov-
ernance. This Article posits legitimate governance need not always be 
based upon the norm of democracy, especially of elections, but recog-
nizes it may be an appropriate focus for certain functions.25 
The external democratic accountability critique faces an additional 
problem: it does not justify requiring NGOs to represent the beneficiaries 
of its actions. Should a corporation be held accountable primarily by its 
shareholders or its consumers? The same issue applies here: members are 
the primary determinants of internal NGO accountability, while benefici-
aries are rightly viewed as external accountability holders who at all 
times possess reputational controls, but who may possess greater rights 
to hold NGOs accountable depending upon the function performed by 
                                                                                                             
 19. See David Chandler, New Rights for the Old? Cosmopolitan Citizenship and the 
Critique of State Sovereignty, 51 POL. STUD. 332, 336 (2003). 
 20. Id. at 340 (internal quotation omitted). See also Johan Galtung, Alternative Mod-
els for Global Democracy, in GLOBAL DEMOCRACY: KEY DEBATES 143, 155 (Barry Hol-
den ed., 2000). 
 21. See Peter J. Spiro, The Democratic Accountability of Non-Governmental Organi-
zations, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 161, 163 (2002). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. A. Claire Cutler et al., The Contours and Significance of Private Authority in 
International Affairs, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 333, 369 (A. 
Claire Cutler et al. eds., 1999). 
 25. Therefore, this Article does not go so far as some scholars as to suggest NGOs 
can claim legitimate representative rights over beneficiaries without being democratic or 
accountable to such beneficiaries. See Klaus Dieter Wolf, Private Actors and the Legiti-
macy of Governance Beyond the State, paper presented at ECPR Joint Session Work-
shop, Grenoble (2001), http://www.ifs.tu-darmstadt.de/fileadmin/pg/media/papers/civil. 
pdf. 
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the organization. For instance, where the NGO claims to represent the 
beneficiaries in a lobbying activity, beneficiaries should have a stronger 
right to constrain NGO actions than where NGOs are merely establishing 
standards they believe will help certain populations.26 
Although democratic accountability can be important, a leading de-
mocratic political theorist, Robert Dahl, noted, “international organiza-
tions are not and are not likely to be democratic.”27 Dahl suggests inter-
national institutions be analyzed as bureaucratic bargaining systems, not 
as democratic governance regimes.28 This view has begun to take hold, 
as the traditional demos theory of legitimacy has largely been replaced 
by international relations theorists who break legitimacy into two basic 
components: input or institutional legitimacy, which is derived from de-
mocratic expressions of the affected public’s will,29 and output or task-
specific legitimacy, which is based upon the effectiveness of actions 
taken to achieve normatively salient goals.30 This Article posits account-
ability, recognized to contribute to legitimacy,31 should undergo a similar 
dual analysis.32 
Although traditional task-specific accountability analyses have focused 
on the effectiveness of governance outcomes,33 this Article seeks to rede-
                                                                                                             
 26. See id. 
 27. Dahl, supra note 14, at 32. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Institutional legitimacy can also be found through tradition and symbols. See 
Keohane & Nye, supra note 5. Since these forms of legitimacy are not readily encom-
passed within accountability structures or applicable to international institutions, they are 
not discussed in this Article. See id. 
 30. See Fritz W. Scharpf, Interdependence and Democratic Legitimation 2 (Max 
Planck Inst., Working Paper No. 98/2, 1998), available at http://www.mpi-fg-
koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp98-2/wp98-2.html; FRITZ W. SCHARPF, GAMES REAL 
ACTORS PLAY: ACTOR-CENTERED INSTITUTIONALISM IN POLICY RESEARCH 153 (1997); 
PENTTI SADENIEMI, PRINCIPLES OF LEGITIMACY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1995); 
see also Alan F. Fowler, Assessing NGO Performance: Difficulties, Dilemmas, and a 
Way Ahead, in BEYOND THE MAGIC BULLET: NGO PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 169 (Michael Edwards & David Hulme eds., 1996) 
[hereinafter BEYOND THE MAGIC BULLET] (arguing for performance-based analysis of 
NGOs to include output, outcome, and impact related measures); Debora Spar & James 
Dail, Of Measurement and Mission: Accounting for Performance in Non-Governmental 
Organizations, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 171, 177–78 (2002) (discussing Fowler’s performance 
analysis framework). 
 31. Grant & Keohane, supra note 4. 
 32. This follows Grant and Keohane’s analysis of democratic and non-democratic 
forms of accountability. See id. 
 33. See, e.g., Ngaire Woods, Who Should Govern the World Economy: The Chal-
lenges of Globalization and Governance, 9 RENEWAL 73, 78 (2001) (“The democratic 
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fine the analysis to legitimize the performance of the tasks themselves 
through procedural mechanisms which promote both greater internal and 
external accountability.34 A task-specific approach makes clear not all 
tasks or functions need to be legitimized by governance outcomes even 
at the international level where the existence of a demos is heavily ques-
tioned. Varying combinations of input and output controls can promote 
legitimacy in different functional circumstances and, depending upon the 
mechanisms required, can promote democratic accountability.35 This Ar-
ticle does not propose a democracy- or delegatory-based accountability 
control system is appropriate in all cases,36 but rather legitimizing con-
trols will depend upon the functions performed. Accordingly, this Article 
posits the traditional emphasis on democratic principles to guide ac-
countability controls is misplaced.37 
B. Moving Beyond Democratic Accountability 
Although there has been a historic over-reliance on democratic con-
trols, alternative measures to hold non-state actors accountable, such as 
profitability, are not necessarily appropriate or valuable yardsticks for 
determining NGO performance.38 Basing their typology on a delegatory 
model of international governance, Keohane, Grant and Nye demonstrate 
the existence of multiple forms of internal and external accountability, 
though they question the ability of some of the mechanisms they describe 
to adequately hold some international governance actors accountable in 
                                                                                                             
legitimacy of ‘network governance’ relies on a new way of conceiving of democracy 
which . . . shifts the focus from the ‘inputs’ of the decision-making system (i.e. elections 
and representative government) to the quality of the ‘outputs’ of the system.”). 
 34. While authors have discussed procedural mechanisms in terms of internal ac-
countability constraints, it may be equally applicable to external accountability, where 
stakeholders are not members of NGOs, but rather beneficiaries. See U.N. Dev. Pro-
gramme, Human Dev. Report Office, Civil Society and Accountability 2 (2002), available 
at http://hdr.undp.org/docs/publications/background_papers/2002/Kaldor_2002.pdf (pre-
pared by Mary Kaldor). 
 35. This combination of input- and output-based accountability controls exists even in 
the United States, widely hailed as a country with strong democratic accountability con-
trols. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 6–7, 26 (noting legal accountability might 
promote both input- and output-based legitimacy). 
 36. For a discussion of the need for an international demos to support democratic 
governance, see Zürn, supra note 16. 
 37. Grant & Keohane, supra note 4. 
 38. Spar & Dail, supra note 30, at 176. For different approaches to assessing NGO 
performance, see id. at 176 n.12. 
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certain circumstances.39 The grab bag of control mechanisms derived 
from the delegatory system of governance referenced by Keohane, Grant 
and Nye include fiscal, market, supervisory, legal, peer, market, reputa-
tional, and hierarchical accountability mechanisms.40 
Fiscal accountability, also known as financial conditionality, refers to 
the external controls which the individual or institution holding the purse 
string can exert over the governance actor.41 These controls include not 
only conditions a financier may impose upon an NGO, but also may in-
clude, inter alia, national regulations preventing an NGO from engaging 
in for-profit activities or decisions made by individuals with conflicts of 
interests. Keohane and Grant suggest this form of accountability is 
particularly strong for NGOs which are highly dependent upon external 
grants and funding.42 The necessity of financing for sustainability creates 
a competitive financing market, with NGOs seeking to carve out market 
niches and branding.43 This competitive effect may cause NGOs to act 
like for-profit actors—similar to the situation in which NGOs compete 
for government contracts—and therefore may cause NGOs to act con-
trary to the interests of their memberships, their funders’ interests, or 
their beneficiaries.44 
Similar to fiscal accountability, market accountability, or the means by 
which NGOs obtain financing or membership in a competitive NGO en-
vironment, can also be a powerful external method to control runaway 
NGO behavior.45 This form of accountability in the NGO context, how-
ever, is less compelling, as most NGOs create particular niche markets or 
brands, making their services less substitutable and thereby decreasing 
the likelihood perfect NGO markets for financing, services, or member-
ships exist. 
Supervisory accountability is another form of external accountability 
whereby those who have delegated authority to the NGOs may withdraw 
such authority or censure the NGOs for failing to follow instructions. In 
                                                                                                             
 39. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 1–5; see also Grant & Keohane, supra note 4; 
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New Administrative 
Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687, 1692 (2003) (arguing market accountability mechanisms 
may not be sufficient to ensure proper provision of some social services by non-state 
actors). 
 40. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 4–5; Grant & Keohane, supra note 4, at 8. 
 41. Grant & Keohane, supra note 4, at 8. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Kaldor, supra note 34, at 24. 
 44. See DAVID LEWIS, THE MANAGEMENT OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL DEVELOPMENT 
ORGANISATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 199–200 (2001). 
 45. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 4, at 9–10. 
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international governance this is a particularly powerful type of account-
ability mechanism, as evidenced by the adherence of the World Bank and 
IMF to the standards demanded by the Member States overseeing (and 
funding) their operation.46 This form of accountability control is even 
more powerful for NGOs dependent upon government contracts and rela-
tionships for viability and financing. 
Another external constraint upon NGO behavior is legal accountability. 
Although this form of accountability has potency at the domestic level to 
prevent private inurement or other self-serving behavior of officers, at 
the international level, without greater harmonization, it will likely be 
fairly weak at ensuring accountability.47 Additionally, no international 
law governs the operation of NGOs. Rather, legal accountability in inter-
national governance might be considered contract accountability, 
whereby NGOs are required to follow the terms of a contract signed with 
other governance actors. Failure to abide by those terms could have the 
same individual and organizational consequences as those imposed by 
legal sanctions or penalties. This revised view of legal accountability in 
the international governance context indicates such constraints might be 
important for NGOs acting in a governance capacity. 
Peer accountability is how actors in a horizontal relationship with the 
NGO performing a governance function hold the NGO to certain stan-
dards of accountability. NGOs often act as coalitions to coalesce the nec-
essary resources, expertise, and relationships to achieve particular func-
tions;48 peer accountability regulates the relationship between these part-
nerships to a certain extent. However, as discussed below, this form of 
accountability is questionable as a source of normatively justified con-
straints on actor behavior. 
Concerns of exacerbating representational imbalances through partici-
pation of unaccountable NGOs have caused some scholars to suggest the 
greater use of peer accountability mechanisms to ensure the appropriate 
representativeness of NGOs.49 This argument suggests, however, it might 
be limited to a situation of network governance.50 To the author’s mind, 
                                                                                                             
 46. See id. at 8–9. 
 47. See id. at 9–12. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Goodin, supra note 5, at 29–30. 
 50. Partnerships and linkages, especially with local groups, are crucial for the success 
of many international NGOs. See MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS 
BEYOND BORDERS 23–29 (1998); Grant & Keohane, supra note 4. In such situations, the 
partnership has a normative right to hold members of the partnership (externally) ac-
countable with respect to actions taken affecting the partnership. See Paul Wapner, De-
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peer review is rarely, if ever, a normatively satisfactory means by which 
to hold actors accountable, but is only a second- or third-best solution. 
Since peer organizations are only very indirectly affected by the actions 
of other similarly situated NGOs,51 their normative right to hold other 
NGOs accountable is limited at best (when not a partner in a particular 
governance function) and may be limited further based on the particular 
functions performed by NGOs. 
Additionally, little normative support is provided for the concept of us-
ing peer accountability mechanisms instead of other accountability con-
trols in non-network governance structures. This is important because 
where NGOs perform actions similar to government entities, or replace 
what might otherwise be government activities, requiring less account-
ability assurances of NGOs than of government actors may present op-
portunities for game-playing and other self-serving activities. This Arti-
cle does not directly oppose such theories, although it seemingly con-
flicts with existing theories of accountability which suggest different ac-
tors should not be required to meet the same accountability controls, re-
lying upon (unequal) checks and balances as accountability controls.52 
Rather, this theory suggests function, rather than actor, is how account-
ability controls should be established.53 
                                                                                                             
fending Accountability in NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 202 (2002) (“Whenever an NGO 
links or otherwise collaborates with another, it opens itself up to scrutiny and evaluation. 
To the degree that NGOs find strength in doing so, however, accountability becomes part 
of the price of increased transnational effectiveness.”). However, the right to hold actors 
accountable or impose sanctions upon those other organizations is normatively suspect. 
Funding competition may promote such self-serving behavior, but the right of these peer 
organizations to hold each other accountable is limited, since they do not purport to act 
on each other’s behalf. 
 51. Other NGOs might be affected by the actions of a particular NGO through reputa-
tional effects on the NGO sector or as a result of information failures attributing improper 
NGO actions not exclusively to the offending NGO. See EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING 
AGENCIES TO WORK TOGETHER: THE PRACTICE AND THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CRAFTS-
MANSHIP 144–46 (1998). Sole reliance on peer accountability mechanisms may, in fact, 
promote the creation of collusive networks. See Goodin, supra note 5, at 45. 
 52. See, e.g., Goodin, supra note 5, at 37–38. Goodin’s analysis, however, often con-
flates internal and external accountability, making theoretical extrapolations from his 
argument difficult. See id. at 42. 
 53. This Article is open to the possibility the theory it propounds might require incor-
poration of the two theories insofar as actors performing a particular function would re-
quire particular accountability controls, though the exact form or extent of those controls 
might vary depending upon the actor. Practically, the form of accountability must neces-
sarily vary by actor, as different procedural mechanisms are necessary to implement in-
tended accountability controls. However, this Article considers the constraining effect on 
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Reputational accountability is the least well-defined of the various ac-
countability mechanisms laid out in Keohane, Grant, and Nye’s typol-
ogy. They recognize this form of accountability is often dependent upon, 
or even coterminous with, other forms of accountability, especially mar-
ket accountability, though it is possible reputational effects may exist 
outside those of other accountability constraints.54 
The argument goes: reputational forces regulate the extent to which 
NGOs must address internal accountability, since no exit barriers exist 
for members, and the NGO “markets” for membership are generally 
competitive.55 Albert Hirschman, however, has shown the dangers of this 
reasoning. He notes where individuals can exit an organization’s mem-
bership easily and join another organization; there is little incentive for 
the individual to use her voice to improve the organization.56 Given the 
sheer number of NGOs, even in a particular issue area, competition be-
tween NGOs is not likely to significantly contribute to greater internal 
accountability. So long as a particular NGO captures the majority of an 
individual’s preferences, the NGO may make a number of minor policy 
choices without membership support or fear of significant reprisal.57 
Additionally, where members seek to hold their representative organi-
zations accountable, there are significant barriers to entry, which come in 
the form of information costs.58 An individual may have invested a sig-
                                                                                                             
actor behavior to be theoretically equivalent for all actors performing a particular func-
tion. Differential treatment based on type of organization, then, is justified only to the 
extent such treatment can equalize the ultimate level of accountability achieved across 
organizations performing the same governance function. This, however, would not jus-
tify, from a normative perspective, the use of different types of accountability controls to 
equalize total accountability; it would only justify a greater level of the same controls 
used to ensure accountability of other actors. 
 54. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 17; Grant & Keohane, supra note 4, at 9. 
 55. See Spiro, supra note 21, at 163–64,166–67 (also noting some concerns regarding 
monopoly power may exist in certain circumstances). 
 56. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSE TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 84 (1970). 
 57. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Packaged Preferences and the Institutional 
Transformation of Interests, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1443 (1994). 
 58. Scholars on this topic have typically assumed basic, media-related monitoring is 
sufficient to achieve internal accountability, but this again conflates the issue of internal 
and external sovereignty to the extent it is assumed media-related monitoring is accurate 
and wholly accepted by the membership. See, e.g., Moisés Naím, Lori’s War, FOREIGN 
POL’Y, Spring 2000, at 28, 39. Spiro analogized NGO membership to corporate share-
holder management (who can similarly enter and exit with relative ease) which Spiro 
claims is formally clear, but practically limited due to the high costs of monitoring and 
collective action problems. Spiro, supra note 21, at 165. But see Goodin, supra note 5, at 
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nificant amount of energy into learning about an organization’s activities, 
and after review of those activities, suggested new directions for the or-
ganization. If those suggestions fall on deaf ears, she may choose to 
leave. However, prior to joining an organization, she does not necessarily 
know whether it is highly representative without a significant amount of 
research. 
Additionally, in order for any organization to be held truly accountable 
by its internal membership through reputational mechanisms, the indi-
vidual members must also incur significant information-gathering costs 
to learn about the organization’s activities and then incur moderate par-
ticipation costs. It therefore may be unrealistic to expect NGO competi-
tion alone would achieve greater internal accountability and representa-
tiveness.59 This is borne out in practice, where such competition exists, 
but few organizations are held accountable to their memberships directly, 
especially in lower-order decisions. 
While the competition issue is usually buttressed by assertions NGOs’ 
claims to legitimacy depend upon self-regulation, or the creation of in-
ternal accountability mechanisms,60 this approach falls short as a frame-
work for establishing accountability. As an accountability control, com-
petition establishes a reliance upon other, (generally) non-regime-related 
organizations to hold the participating NGOs to account.61 From both 
systemic and normative perspectives, this seems as undesirable as peer 
accountability mechanisms. 
Finally, NGOs might regulate themselves through the internal account-
ability mechanism of hierarchy. Individual officers and agents of an 
NGO are held accountable to standards established by the NGO’s man-
agement and organizational structure. Failure to abide by the NGO’s own 
standards may result in salary cuts or firing and therefore can act as sig-
nificant deterrents to impropriety.62 For instance, incorporation creates 
hierarchical internal accountability within the organization.63 However, 
                                                                                                             
7 (“[I]n the non-profit sector there is simply no equivalent to ‘voters’ in the state sector or 
‘shareholders’ in the market sector.”). The likelihood of media-related monitoring is per-
haps even greater in the corporate context than in NGO context, so this argument seems 
to lack much merit. At best, Spiro’s argument counsels for greater monitoring of corpo-
rate accountability when corporations are acting in democratic international governance 
schemes. 
 59. See Spiro, supra note 21, at 163. 
 60. See L. David Brown et al., Globalization, NGOs and Multi-Sectoral Relations 27 
(Hauser Ctr. For Nonprofit Orgs., Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 1, 2000). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Goodin, supra note 5, at 5–7. 
 63. Id. at 6–7. 
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while incorporation may control some rent-seeking behavior by individ-
ual officers, it does little to influence the behavior of a fly-by-night or 
otherwise wholly corrupt NGO. It does, however, create transparency 
and reporting obligations which may increase the cost of being corrupt 
and thereby increase accountability.  
As this cursory discussion illustrates, non-democratic accountability 
mechanisms exist. However, each method of control has its own unique 
strengths and weaknesses and range of applicability, all of which is often 
highly context- and function-dependent. Often, however, a particular ac-
tion may be held to account by a number of different mechanisms. The 
task of the accountability holder is then to determine both the type and 
extent of the particular mechanism to be applied. This is no easy task. 
This Article seeks to begin this process by aligning particular governance 
functions to the type of accountability controls most appropriate from a 
normative standpoint. Although not definitive in its approach, the Article 
does suggest a prototypical framework which the author expects will re-
quire further refinement and development to make it fully operational. 
Although this Article breaks new ground in establishing a function-
based approach to accountability controls, some scholars have already 
illustrated some of the context-dependency of delegatory or non-
democratic accountability controls, noting, for instance, market and repu-
tational accountability depend upon transparency for effectiveness.64 De-
spite these contextual concerns and prerequisites to effectiveness, many 
authors have seemed to assume the mere existence of these accountabil-
ity mechanisms somehow means such mechanisms are sufficient to hold 
actors accountable.65 For instance, even Keohane has suggested NGOs 
                                                                                                             
 64. See Thomas Hale, Managing the Disaggregation of Development: How the Jo-
hannesburg “Type II” Partnerships can be Made Effective 23–26 (2003), http://www. 
wws.princeton.edu/mauzerall/wws402f_s03/JP.ThomasHale.pdf. 
 65. See Thomas Hale & Denise L. Mauzerall, Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: 
Can the Johannesburg Partnerships Coordinate Action on Sustainable Development?, 13 
J. ENVTL. DEV. 220, 226–29, available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/mauzerall/ 
papers/Hale.Mauzerall.JED.final.pdf. Hale and Mauzerall argue reputational, market and, 
indirectly, financial accountability, can hold private partnerships accountable to a broad-
based constituency of affected stakeholders. Id. See also Hale, supra note 64, at 22. 
However, they do not identify which stakeholders should have a right to hold the actors 
accountable or how they are affected or even relate to the accountability mechanisms 
assumed to be effective. Additionally, they undermine their own argument by recogniz-
ing “reputational and market accountability . . . does not work equally well on all types of 
actors. ‘Brand-less’ corporations, non-democratic governments, and projects with guaran-
teed funding sources are resistant to the kind of reputational and market enforcement 
powers the proposed regulatory regime would apply.”  Hale & Mauzerall, supra at 19; 
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“are highly vulnerable to threats to their reputations.”66 This Article ar-
gues even where contextual prerequisites can be met, accountability 
mechanisms are not necessarily appropriate or effective constraints on 
actor behavior when performing different functions. This is particularly 
important since “[a]ccountability is not a pure good” where more is nec-
essarily better,67 and “the total possibilities for participation are ines-
capably constrained by the need to accomplish the institution’s tasks.”68 
NGO involvement in global governance must be limited both by number 
and type of organizations in order to ensure governance occurs. 
While contextualizing these issues is difficult and should necessarily 
be beyond the scope of academic work such as this, the importance of 
this analysis is to reveal the level of generality and false grouping is 
standard practice in NGO scholarship and the need for a more function-
based analysis of accountability. The amount of allowable government 
support, for instance, should depend upon the particular functions per-
formed by the NGO. Some political groups may receive government 
                                                                                                             
Hale, supra note 64, at 26. Hale and Mauzerall incorrectly understand Keohane and 
Nye’s reputational and market accountability issues by linking them with funding, and 
also consider many of the accountability mechanisms discussed by Keohane and Nye to 
be “horizontal” forms of accountability. Hale & Mauzerall, supra, at 14–15, 19; Hale, 
supra note 64, at 22. However, despite Schmitter’s definition of horizontal accountability 
as “the existence of permanently constituted, mutually recognized collective actors at 
multiple levels of aggregation within a policy that have equivalent capacities to monitor 
each other’s behavior and to react to each other’s initiatives,” Philippe C. Schmitter, The 
Limits of Horizontal Accountability, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE, supra note 9, at 
59, 61, this view of accountability is more akin to “checks and balances,” see Guillermo 
O’Donnell, Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING 
STATE, supra note 9, at 29, 39 (stating effective horizontal accountability requires state 
agencies with authority and autonomy, as well as a willingness to oversee, remedy, and 
sanction other agencies’ unlawful actions), which are not technically accountability con-
trols. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 4, at 7–9. Instead, horizontal accountability truly 
implies peer accountability, not accountability through the participation of multiple levels 
of affected stakeholders who may not be social equals. See Keohane, Political Account-
ability, supra note 5, at 20. In fact, “NGOs are weak compared to governments.”  Keo-
hane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, supra note 1, at 145. Although 
this Article does not discount the importance of transparency generally for ensuring ac-
countability, it nevertheless does not support the exclusively project-based view of Hale 
and Mauzerall. Rather, this Article believes that both internal and external accountability 
concerns must be addressed equally for accountability and legitimacy to be ensured. 
 66. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, supra note 1, at 
148. 
 67. See Robert O. Keohane, Commentary on the Democratic Accountability of Non-
Governmental Organizations, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 477, 477 (2002). 
 68. Kingsbury, supra note 6, at 186 (citation omitted). 
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funds while others do not; if an NGO is to lobby an international organi-
zation for a particular policy, is it appropriate to include political groups 
funded by States? Or should only fully independent groups be allowed to 
participate? The answers to these questions and others can and should 
vary based upon the function the NGO seeks to perform and the interna-
tional regime’s normative values. This Article seeks to establish a basic 
functional typology for establishing accountability controls for NGOs 
participating in international governance. 
Most prominent NGO scholars, including those demanding greater in-
ternal and external accountability controls, consider NGOs to be rela-
tively weak institutional players. For instance, Keohane does not recom-
mend strong accountability controls of “relatively weak NGOs,” but 
notes “as a particular NGO gains influence, it can exert effects, for good 
or ill, on people not its members. At this point, it can be legitimately held 
externally accountable as other powerful entities operate in world poli-
tics.”69 Keohane suggests such limited controls because he considers 
NGOs to be mere lobbyists.70 This Article agrees with Keohane’s passing 
comment regarding the increasing power of external accountability con-
trols as an NGO gains influence, but takes a slightly different approach: 
as NGOs perform different functions, the level of power they wield over 
an international governance system changes, and therefore the strength of 
controls based on internal accountability and external accountability to 
the regime itself should vary according to the importance of its function 
and level of control over outcomes. External accountability to beneficiar-
ies, on the other hand, should only be implicated where there is a possi-
ble impact upon the choice or rights of beneficiaries.71 Departing from 
most scholarship on NGO accountability, this Article seeks to determine 
which forms of accountability are appropriate when. As Keohane ex-
plains, “[T]o establish that some accountability exists is not to reach a 
normatively significant conclusion. From a normative standpoint, the 
relevant question is whether a given set of accountability relationships is 
appropriate with respect to their type and extent.”72 This theory extends 
the normative debate to the function of the actor as well, recognizing 
                                                                                                             
 69. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, supra note 1, at 
148. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOS, AND GRASS-
ROOTS MOVEMENTS 12–17 (Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998). 
 72. Keohane, Political Accountability, supra note 5, at 9. 
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“the particular configuration of accountability mechanisms in individual 
institutions matters.”73 
Though accountability controls are necessary, both the form and 
strength of the controls should be, in the first instance, dependent upon 
the function which the NGO intends to perform, as opposed to analyzing 
the NGO itself (whether based upon a comparative power analysis or 
otherwise). NGO legitimacy in international governance is largely de-
rived from claims of representation of under-served, disenfranchised, or 
otherwise disempowered populations.74  
[NGO’s] claims to a legitimate voice over policy are based on the dis-
advantaged people for whom they claim to speak, and on the abstract 
principles they espouse. But they are internally accountable to wealthy, 
relatively public-spirited people in the United States and other rich 
countries, who do not experience the results of their actions. Hence 
there is a danger that they will engage in symbolic politics, satisfying to 
their internal constituencies but unresponsive to the real needs of the 
people whom they claim to serve.75 
This is especially acute since the United Nations (UN) defines NGOs as 
not-for-profit entities.76 
From a normative standpoint, however, NGOs need not be externally 
accountable to the beneficiaries of NGO action, but rather only to its 
members (funders, etc.), unless the NGO is acting as a “public” operative 
arm of a governance regime or affects the rights or choices of its benefi-
ciaries.77 This helps to resolve the problems arising when NGOs become 
                                                                                                             
 73. See Arthur Benz & Yannis Papadopoulos, Is Network Governance Democratic? 
Different Assessments for the National and International Level (Center for Democratic 
Governance, first draft, 2003), http://www.demnetgov.ruc.dk/conference/papers/Hel- 
singoerAB-YP1.pdf. 
 74. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 378. Since the beginning of NGO involvement in 
international governance, however, NGOs have gained significant policy expertise and 
have gained a new source of legitimacy for involvement in international governance. 
 75. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, supra note 1, at 
148. 
 76. See supra note 2. 
 77. See Brühl, supra note 16, at 378 (“As long as private actors do not decide authori-
tatively on public policy, they neither have to have a democratic structure nor do they 
have to be elected by (sectoral) demoi.”) (internal citation omitted). Although the defini-
tion of “authoritatively” is not clear, this Article agrees with Brühl’s proposition insofar 
as NGOs are not decision-makers. Where NGOs are decision-makers, even if part of a 
larger group of decision-makers, then NGOs should be held accountable under democ-
ratic accountability mechanisms. However, this Article does not argue such accountabil-
ity should necessarily extend beyond its membership. 
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service providers on behalf of governance regimes but apply incorrect 
strategies, undermining the effectiveness of other approaches, or divert-
ing funds away from other, more successful ones.78 In such circum-
stances, the regime must be accountable to the beneficiaries to some ex-
tent, and output-based legitimacy concerns contain some validity. How-
ever, the NGO’s function, rather than its participation, is what deter-
mines the choices available to beneficiaries.79 Therefore, it does not mat-
ter for the beneficiaries who provides the service, but only the manner in 
which it is provided. 
Table 1 provides a basic overview of the typology established by this 
Article, which shall be developed in greater detail in Part IV.A.80 Politi-
cal functions are those functions which generally involve some level of 
representation, and therefore require some modicum of democratic ac-
countability to those represented, the level of which depends upon the 
level of representation needed and the influence over the process exerted 
by the NGO. Administrative functions, on the other hand, do not require 
democratic representation, as such actions are related to performing gov-
ernance functions designed to improve the management of the govern-
ance regime. Representation of internal member interests is therefore 
correlated to that function, but can be achieved without necessitating 
democratic accountability; fiscal and hierarchical controls may achieve 
the needed efficiencies and spending controls to ensure good governance. 
At all times, however, NGOs are acting as delegated authorities, per-
forming governance functions in lieu of the regime and are therefore 
primarily responsible to the governments sanctioning the NGO adminis-
trative actions. NGOs performing enforcement functions, depending 
upon the NGO’s role in the enforcement process, must ensure account-
ability both to their memberships and possibly their beneficiaries, as well 
as to the regime generally. Authority under such a governance arrange-
ment is less one of delegation, however, as NGOs are generally involved 
in an enforcement role to ensure independence and regime accountability 
to the global demos. The next Parts will discuss the relationship between  
 
                                                                                                             
 78. See Sonia Arllano-Lopez & James F. Petras, Non-Governmental Organisations 
and Poverty Alleviation in Bolivia, 25 DEV. & CHANGE 555 (1994). 
 79. See David Held, Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty, 8 
LEGAL THEORY 1, 26 (2002). 
     80.  See Grant & Keohane, supra note 4; Keohane & Nye, supra note 5.  This table 
excludes market and reputational controls, since they are not imposed by the listed actors. 
Additionally, “hierarchical” subsumes all principal-agent relationships, including those of 
member or beneficiary representation. 
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Table 1: Mapping Accountability Controls to NGO Governance Functions 
 
 
 
 
FUNCTIONS ACCOUNTABILITY HOLDERS 
 
 Internal-  
Membership 
External-  
Beneficiaries 
External-  
Regime 
Political Activities  
   Agenda-setting High: 
hierarchical,  
fiscal 
Maybe: 
hierarchical  
None to  
Limited: 
peer 
   Norm and Rule  
   Formation 
High:  
hierarchical,  
fiscal   
Maybe:  
hierarchical 
None to  
Limited:  
peer 
   General Participation High: 
hierarchical,  
fiscal 
Maybe:  
hierarchical 
None to  
Limited:  
peer 
Administrative Duties  
   Certification Limited:  
hierarchical,  
fiscal 
None to  
Limited 
High: 
legal, fiscal,  
supervisory  
   Standard Setting Limited  
to High: 
hierarchical,  
fiscal 
Maybe:  
hierarchical  
High:  
legal, fiscal,  
supervisory,  
peer 
   Training and  
   Information 
Limited:  
hierarchical, 
fiscal 
None to  
Limited 
High:  
legal, fiscal, 
supervisory,  
peer 
   Service Provision Limited  
to High: 
hierarchical,  
fiscal 
High: 
hierarchical 
High:  
legal, fiscal,  
supervisory,  
hierarchical 
   Other Administrative  
   Functions 
Limited: 
hierarchical,  
fiscal 
None to  
Limited 
High 
Enforcement  
   Arbitration Limited:  
hierarchical,  
fiscal 
None to  
Limited 
High:  
legal, fiscal, 
supervisory,  
hierarchical 
   Monitoring High: 
hierarchical,  
fiscal 
Maybe:  
hierarchical 
None to  
Moderate:  
supervisory 
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the accountability needed, normatively appropriate accountability 
mechanisms, and the functions performed by NGOs in greater detail. 
III. THE VARIED FUNCTIONS OF NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE 
The deconstruction of accountability theory as applied to NGOs in the 
previous Part suggests accountability controls depend upon the functions 
undertaken by NGOs in international governance. Absent such a func-
tional approach, NGOs participate in various governance functions with-
out having duties to participate appropriately.81 This Part discusses the 
varied functions NGOs perform in international governance to illustrate 
the complexity of the issue and the need for more nuanced accountability 
theories regarding NGO participation.82 
                                                                                                             
 81. Richard Devetak & Richard Higgott, Saving the Social Bond and Recovering the 
Public Domain, in THE MARKET OR THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE & THE 
ASSYMETRY OF POWER 20 (Daniel Drache ed., 2001), available at http://www.yorku. 
ca/robarts/archives/pub_domain/pdf/apd_higgottfin.pdf. 
 82. NGO participation in international governance has blossomed in recent years and 
has taken many different avenues. See Kal Raustiala, The “Participatory Revolution” in 
International Environmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 538–39 (1997); Jona-
than P. Doh & H. Teegen, Nongovernmental Organizations as Institutional Actors in 
International Business: Theory and Implications, 11 INT’L BUS. REV. 665 (2002). See 
generally A. Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Devel-
opment of International Environmental Law, 68 CHI. KENT L. REV. 61 (1992). While 
some have distinguished between various different civil society actors based on purpose, 
function, and funding, limiting evaluation of NGOs to service provision and advocacy, 
this Article expands the analysis of NGOs to whenever they perform any of the functions 
associated primarily with non-NGO groups, including social movements, social organiza-
tions, and religious groups. See Kaldor, supra note 34, at 12 tbls. 1, 17, 19 (noting al-
though distinct, social movements and social organizations may be considered NGOs). 
Additionally, the analysis set forth by Kaldor and others is an actor-based model, as op-
posed to a function-based model, and does not attempt to map different accountability 
controls to the different actors or functions performed. Similarly, other authors have dis-
cussed the role of NGOs in partnership arrangements with companies and in the creation 
of corporate codes of conduct or privately-created standards. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Doh & 
Terrence R. Guay, Globalization and Corporate Social Responsibility: How Nongovern-
mental Organizations Influence Labor and Environmental Codes of Conduct (manuscript 
on file with Brooklyn Journal of International Law); Bas Arts, “Green Alliances” of 
Business and NGOs: New Styles of Self-Regulation or “Dead-End Roads?”, 9 CORP. 
SOCIAL RESP. & ENVTL. MGMT. 26 (2002); Adelle Blackett, Global Governance, Legal 
Pluralism and the Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate Con-
duct, 8 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 401 (2001). See also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE 
APPAREL INDUSTRY AND CODES OF CONDUCT: A SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CHILD 
LABOR PROBLEM? 124–207 (1996), available at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/ 
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“[Public-private partnerships] can . . . be classified according to their 
purposes and function into one of three categories,” either rule and stan-
dard setting, rule implementation, or service provision.83  This model, 
established by Börzel and Risse, is a very useful start to this Article’s 
analysis, despite excluding an examination of NGO participation when 
performing political or lobbying functions.84 This Article follows the 
same basic process in categorizing NGOs by function, with some slight 
variations and greater detail. Despite this greater detail, of course, the 
following categorization by no means provides an exhaustive list of func-
tions NGOs may perform in governance regimes, but it does provide a 
basic categorization and framework of NGO functions, thereby establish-
ing a starting point for more nuanced discussions of NGO participation 
in international governance. 
A. Policy Formulation 
Traditional scholarship on NGO participation in international govern-
ance has focused on NGO involvement in the creation of norms and poli-
cies. Thus begins this Article’s function-based analysis. Although direct 
NGO involvement is “less frequent in the areas of international rule set-
ting and implementation,”85 it nevertheless exists and is likely to increase 
in the future.86 NGOs performing these functions are often likened to 
Kaldor’s analysis of social movements, which depend upon the ability to 
                                                                                                             
iiclp/apparel/overview.htm; ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STATUS REPORT ON THE USE OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LABELS WORLDWIDE (1993); Tanja A. Börzel & Thomas Risse, Public-
Private Partnerships: Effective and Legitimate Tools of Transnational Governance?, in 
COMPLEX SOVEREIGNTY: RECONSTITUTING POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 195, 203–06 (Edgar Grande & Louis W. Pauly eds., 2004) (noting NGO in-
volvement in the broad definition of governance through self-regulation in the shadow of 
hierarchy or regime-imposed rules and through independent self-regulation adopted by 
regimes). Privately-created standards later adopted by a governance regime are also be-
yond the scope of this Article, as NGOs creating such private standards were not part of 
what might be termed a public-private partnership in the formulation of those standards. 
See Börzel & Risse, supra, at 204. I do not address these arrangements which, under a 
broad definition of governance, might be considered such. Rather, I restrict my analysis 
to NGO roles in formulating policies adopted by international governments and in inter-
national governance as it relates to government-sanctioned and authorized action in-
tended to replace or assist a function otherwise performed by a government institution or 
its agent. See supra note 1. 
 83. Börzel & Risse, supra note 82, at 199 (noting public-private partnerships might be 
categorized by ways in which they regulate behavior). 
 84. See id. at 198. 
 85. Börzel & Risse, supra note 82, at 204. 
 86. See id. at 204–06. 
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mobilize members into action.87 This, in a sense, is a reliance upon the 
“market accountability” mechanism.88 As will be shown in the following 
sections, there are a number of different functions falling within the 
broad category of policy formulation relying upon the purpose and repre-
sentativeness of the NGOs seeking to perform those actions. 
1. Agenda-Setting 
Agenda-setting is one of the most important governance functions an 
organization can perform, as it places items onto the table for discussion 
and analysis, initiating the possibility of governance changes.89 Gener-
ally, agenda-setting functions are limited to State actors in international 
governance regimes. However, where NGOs are instrumental in the for-
mulation of the overarching policy framework or where they are incorpo-
rated into a state’s delegation directly, NGOs may have the ability to set 
the agenda for discussion. The World Conservation Union (IUCN) is the 
proto-typical example of this. The IUCN drafted the first version of the 
Convention of Biological Diversity and then was successful in setting the 
agenda of the Convention’s negotiations.90 
Agenda-setting is important for accountability purposes since whoever 
controls the agenda has control over the scope of the governance system 
and its ability to change over time. Self-interest may dominate such 
agenda-setting formulations, as actors with an interest in the status quo 
may reject change through the formulation of the agenda. 
2. Norm and Rule Formulation 
Norm and rule formation, or rule-setting, is the most contentious role 
NGOs play in international governance. Some suggest such a role im-
plies a loss of State sovereignty.91 While this Article does not tackle this 
                                                                                                             
 87. See Kaldor, supra note 34, at 22. 
 88. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 5. 
 89. Although awareness building is generally considered an agenda-setting function, 
this aspect of agenda-setting is evaluated in the general participation section below. For 
the purposes of this section, agenda-setting is limited to formalized processes by which 
participants in a governance regime place issues on the table for negotiation and action. 
See P.J. Simmons & Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Managing Global Issues: An Introduc-
tion, in MANAGING GLOBAL ISSUES: LESSONS LEARNED 3, 12 (P.J. Simmons & Chantal de 
Jonge Oudraat eds., 2001). 
 90. See Brühl, supra note 16, at 373. 
 91. See generally Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organiza-
tions and the “Unregulated” Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 957, 958 (1996) (sug-
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issue, it does recognize NGO involvement in rule-setting can be legiti-
mized. NGOs have successfully participated in rule-setting nationally,92 
as well as in intergovernmental organizations and through independent 
initiatives.93 
The extent of NGO involvement in rule-setting, like any other func-
tional role an NGO might take, varies significantly. NGOs are primarily 
involved as rule setters through incorporation into official delegations, 
which has occurred in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty regime, for 
instance.94 However, NGOs might also be involved in rule-setting in 
their own right. Amnesty International was crucial in shaping the Con-
vention Against Torture and in establishing the International Criminal 
Court.95 Similarly, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines had the 
right to make statements and table treaty language (though not to vote) 
during negotiations of the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-
Personnel Landmines.96 To a lesser extent, NGOs are involved in the 
World Trade Organization and help to shape its outcomes.97 
A shining example of the role of NGOs in rule-setting is found in the 
World Commission on Dams (WCD).98 WCD consists of the World 
                                                                                                             
gesting that nations cede some sovereignty to non-governmental organizations such as 
the WTO). 
 92. See generally Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance 
of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32 (2000); Cary Coglianese, Assessing 
the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to Philip Harter, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 386 (2001); Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the 
Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60 (2000); Siobhan Mee, Comment, Negotiated 
Rulemaking and Combined Sewer Overflows (CSOS): Consensus Saves Ossification?, 25 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 213 (1997). 
 93. See Brühl, supra note 16, at 373–74. 
 94. See Börzel & Risse, supra note 82, at 199. 
 95. See WILLIAM KOREY, NGOS AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: “A CURIOUS GRAPEVINE” (1998). 
 96. See Motoko Mekata, Building Partnerships Toward a Common Goal: Experi-
ences of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, in THE THIRD FORCE: THE RISE 
OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY 143 (Ann M. Florini ed., 2000). 
 97. See generally Daniel C. Esty, Why the World Trade Organization Needs Envi-
ronmental NGOs, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., available at 
http://www.ictsd.org/English/esty.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2005)  (discussing the role of 
NGOs in the WTO, and arguing for expanded formal involvement). See also Peter Suth-
erland, The Doha Development Agenda: Political Challenges to the World Trading Sys-
tem—A Cosmopolitan Perspective, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 363, 374 (2005) (discussing the 
WTO Secretariat’s interest in creating a low-level partnership between the WTO and 
NGOs). 
 98. See Sanjeev Khagram, Toward Democratic Governance for Sustainable Devel-
opment: Transnational Civil Society Organizing Around Big Dams, in THE THIRD FORCE: 
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Bank, national governments, private industry, and NGOs.99 Although the 
WCD’s work is advisory, it is a powerful source of international “soft 
law.”100 Indeed, WCD has been nearly universally lauded as a successful 
experiment to involve NGOs in rule-setting without undermining the au-
thority of the regime or stymieing negotiations and has led to high qual-
ity outcomes considered unattainable under different circumstances.101 
Norm and rule formation begs slightly different questions regarding 
NGO accountability than does agenda-setting. Here, representation of 
issues and interests is important to ensure organizational accountability 
to its membership, and in some cases, its beneficiaries. 
3. General Participation and Lobbying 
The most widely recognized role of NGO participation in international 
governance is one of lobbyist.102 NGOs are renowned for their ability to 
mobilize public awareness and opinion and catalyze action on particular 
issues.103 This differs from the agenda-setting function insofar as NGOs 
do not have the right to set the agenda, but due to the force of NGO lob-
bying, issues are placed upon the agenda by other governance actors. 
Examples of NGO influence, both positive and negative, in interna-
tional governance abound. NGO pressure is widely recognized as cata-
lyzing the formation of the North American Commission on Environ-
mental Cooperation (NACEC) under the North American Free Trade 
                                                                                                             
THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY 83 (Ann M. Florini ed., 2000); see WORLD 
COMM’N ON DAMS (WCD), PROJECT AND FINANCIAL REPORT (2001), available at http:// 
www.damsreport.org/docs/wcdfinrpt.pdf. The WCD was replaced by the Dams and De-
velopment Program in September 2001. 
 99. Khagram, supra note 98, at 83. The WCD was established in 1998 under the 
sponsorship of the World Bank and the IUCN. WCD, Outline of the WCD: Introduction, 
http://www.dams.org/commission/intro.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2005). 
 100. See generally Kader Asmal, Introduction: World Commission on Dams Report, 
Dams and Development, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1411 (2001). 
 101. See WCD, supra note 98, at 2 (“Many felt that the contested nature of the dams 
debate would pull the Commission apart.”); id. at 26 (“The multi-stakeholder process 
followed by the Commission led to recommendations for a new way forward that no 
single perspective could advocate on its own.”). 
 102. Simon Zadek and Murdoch Gatward, Transforming the Transnational NGOs: 
Social Auditing or Bust?, in BEYOND THE MAGIC BULLET, supra note 30, at 227. 
 103. Ann Marie Clark, Non-Governmental Organizations and their Influence on Inter-
national Society, 48 J. INT’L AFF. 507, 510 (1995); Nancy Lindborg, Nongovernmental 
Organizations: Their Past, Present, and Future Role in International Environmental 
Negotiations, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY MAKING 5 (Lawrence Suss-
kind et al. eds., 1992). 
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Agreement (NAFTA),104 for dismantling negotiations of the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment,105 and for assisting in the creation of the Con-
vention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Landmines.106 Like the 
Kosovo Transition Council, which was comprised of political parties, 
religious leaders, and representatives of ethnic minorities, these interna-
tional governance discussions afforded NGOs the opportunity to influ-
ence State action, without providing any real political power to the 
NGOs.107 The impact of NGO involvement in such lobbying situations 
depends upon the willingness of both the governance regime and the 
governance actors within the regime to listen to and adopt NGO posi-
tions. 
Lobbying activities are another political governance function which 
counsels unique accountability controls. Lobbying may or may not imply 
a sense of representation of affected persons, which may counsel external 
accountability to NGO beneficiaries, may only require internal account-
ability to ensure adequate member interest representation, or may require 
no representativeness, depending upon the issue and the purpose with 
which the NGO claims to act. There is little need, however, for external 
accountability to the regime, apart from perhaps ensuring participating 
NGOs do not knowingly provide false information or omit information, 
as the organization can dismiss NGO arguments quite readily.108 
                                                                                                             
 104. PIERRE MARC JOHNSON & ANDRÉ BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA: 
UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW 2 (1996); Fredric 
Menz, An Environmental Policy for North America Post-NAFTA, NO. AM. OUTLOOK, 
Mar. 1994, at 11. 
 105. See generally Rodney Bruce Hall, Private Authority: Non-State Actors and 
Global Governance, 27 HARV. INTL. REV. 2 (2005). 
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 107. See INT’L CRISIS GROUP, ICG BALKANS REPORT NO. 100: KOSOVO REPORT CARD 
28 (2000); INT’L CRISIS GROUP, ICG BALKANS REPORT NO. 97, ELECTIONS IN KOSOVO: 
MOVING TOWARD DEMOCRACY? 2 (2000). 
 108. The circumstances surrounding the dismissal of NGO arguments may affect, ei-
ther positively or negatively, the perceived legitimacy of the governance regime. There-
fore, dismissal may not be so readily done for political reasons. However, the power to 
dismiss arguments does exist and can be exercised, especially if the regime’s legitimacy 
is high. 
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B. Administrative Duties 
Administrative duties differ from political activities because rule-
implementation is the function, rather than rule-setting. As noted above, 
NGO participation in rule-implementation is somewhat minimal, though 
less so than in rule-setting activities.109 These governance functions have 
come to being as international organizations and networks have sought to 
regulate behavior, rather than simply establish norms to be implemented 
at the national level. This specificity has necessitated a more complex 
governance structure, and as a result of institutional or systemic capaci-
ties, has sometimes involved NGOs in the implementation of such re-
gimes. 
The literature on NGO participation in international governance has 
focused little on NGOs acting in an administrative capacity. It is appro-
priate, however, to distinguish democratic and delegatory models of gov-
ernance.110 NGOs performing the functions of a typical administrative 
agency in the domestic context have authority delegated to them by the 
international regime and therefore must be accountable to the regime. 
Questions regarding democratic representativeness of the NGOs them-
selves are less important, as proceduralizing the actions of agencies is the 
dominant accountability control applied in such circumstances, not the 
assurance of direct representation. However, greater representation is 
increasingly sought in administrative actions, though typically limited to 
the role of lobbyists or Advisory Councils, so concerns regarding repre-
sentation may surface to a greater extent in the future. 
1. Certification 
A powerful role NGOs may play in the administration of international 
governance is certification of actors for participation in the regime itself. 
The power to enable participation is significant.111 While this Article 
suggests a shared role in such an accreditation process between the re-
gime, the State hosting the applicant organization, and an independent 
NGO dedicated to certification issues,112 such a system is not always ex-
istent. 
For instance, the Framework Convention on Climate Change, under 
which the Kyoto Protocol on climate change operates, provides the op-
                                                                                                             
 109. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 110. See generally Grant & Keohane, supra note 4. 
 111. See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International 
Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 283 (1997). 
 112. See infra Part IV.C.5. 
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portunity for NGO participation as a certification body, without signifi-
cant co-regulation by the regime, though delegation authority is retained 
by the regime. Article 7.2(a) of the Convention provides the possibility 
NGOs may contract with the Conference of the Parties, where appropri-
ate, to supervise and implement the Convention.113 Article 12.4 provides 
the Conference of Parties with a clear mandate to establish guidelines for 
the certification of carbon sequestration and other projects under the 
Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM).114 Article 12.9 gives the Ex-
ecutive Board authority to provide guidance on participation of various 
stakeholders, both governmental and non-governmental, in that certifica-
tion process.115 The Board, as well as its “operational entities,” which 
may include NGOs, could become a further compliance enforcement 
mechanism under the CDM.116 As a result, Article 7.2(a) may provide 
NGOs the opportunity to act in an implementing role in the CDM.117 
Here, the accountability issues relating to NGO involvement as certifi-
cation entities are complex. External accountability to the regime is im-
portant, but excessive accountability to the regime might undermine the 
expression of, or adherence to, stakeholder interests which the CDM 
                                                                                                             
 113. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 7.2(a), May 9, 
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 115. Id. art. 12.9. 
 116. See Catherine Regdwell, Non-Compliance Procedures and the Climate Change 
Convention, in GLOBAL ENV’T INFO. CTR., GLOBAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE: INTER-
LINKAGES BETWEEN THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND OTHER MULTILATERAL REGIMES ch. 3, at 
22 (1998), available at http://www.geic.or.jp/climgov/03.pdf. 
 117. See supra text accompanying note 113. 
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seeks to support.118 Despite this, internal representation seems of little 
importance, as does external accountability to beneficiaries, since such 
representation would disfavor other relevant interests. 
2. Standard Setting 
NGOs are involved on a somewhat limited basis in actual standard set-
ting in the administrative context. However, where NGOs do have such 
authority, the power they wield is tremendous. While the majority of 
scholars treating this subject focus on private standards (adopted later by 
international regimes, domestic governments, or industry),119 this Article 
deals only with those standards established by NGOs through a public 
international governance system. While limited in its analysis, this Arti-
cle does not agree with most scholars who posit that the International 
Organization for Standardization’s (ISO) standards are completely in-
formal and private. Instead, this Article views ISO as somewhere be-
tween wholly informal and formal, since its members come from na-
tional standards bodies,120 but are not exclusively comprised of govern-
ment entities.121 For instance, the American National Standards Institute, 
a member of ISO, is comprised of government and non-governmental 
                                                                                                             
 118. UNFCCC, supra note 113, art. 4.1(i). 
 119. See, e.g., Colin Scott, Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A Neglected Facet 
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 120. See JAMES R. EVANS & WILLIAM M. LINDSAY, THE MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL 
OF QUALITY 488 (3d ed. 1996). See also Karstin Ronit & Volker Schneider, Global Gov-
ernance Through Private Organizations, 12 GOVERNANCE 243 (1999). 
 121. Haufler, supra note 119, at 127. 
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organizations.122 Therefore, this Article views the ISO standards as non-
binding standards created through public-private partnerships and there-
fore within the purview of this Article. 
A more powerful example of NGO involvement in standard-setting, 
however, is the International Labour Organization (ILO). The ILO, an 
inter-governmental organization designed to protect workers from ex-
ploitation and poor working conditions, provides a role for NGOs, pri-
marily trade unions, in standard-setting.123 For example, NGOs worked 
as members of the ILO to pass the ILO Minimum Age Convention No. 
138 regarding child labor.124 This Convention has been ratified by ap-
proximately 141 countries, some of which have a history of using very 
young child labor.125 The actual impact NGOs have on the content of 
these standards is uncertain.126 However, State delegations include four 
members: two representatives from government, one representative of 
employer interests, and one representative of worker interests.127 Each 
delegate is provided an individual right to vote, so NGO votes do mat-
ter.128 
While many of the ILO’s standards are non-binding recommendations, 
including codes of conduct, resolutions, and declarations, these standards 
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216–19. 
 127. Constitution of the International Labour Organization art. 3, para. 1, June 28, 
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do have the weight of “soft law.”129 Disputes regarding the definition of 
many of these voluntary standards are interpreted by the ILO.130 The ILO 
is also involved in the creation of treaties, which establish binding labor 
and workplace standards, though its role is largely limited to lobbying 
and agenda-setting in treaty formulation.131 
While the ILO is not the only body establishing international corporate 
codes of conduct, it is the most influential source of “soft law” regarding 
labor and workplace standards and has the unique ability to enforce its 
codes.132 As a result, accountability is important to ensure proper NGO 
participation in the ILO standard-setting. While the level of external ac-
countability to the regime is less important when the regime can ensure 
countervailing interests are represented in the standard-setting process, 
external accountability to beneficiaries and internal accountability to 
members may be important to ensure a fair and balanced standard-setting 
process. 
3. Training and Information Provision 
Training administrators and others is a well-known role of NGOs in in-
ternational governance. Capacity-building organizations working with 
the UN Development Programme, for instance, focus on inter-
organizational learning and training,133 serve as experts to governance 
actors,134 and gather information. These NGOs often act in an advisory 
capacity for international governance regimes, serving as “epistemic 
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2005] NGO ACCOUNTABILITY CONCERNS 171 
 
communities” in policy formulation.135 In fact, “[s]ince 1993, the number 
of states that have appealed to NGOs as ad hoc experts in procedures and 
development of international agreements has increased tremendously.”136 
The United States, for instance, incorporates NGOs into international 
policy making through the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 
which provides a role for NGOs to advise United States representatives 
on international policy issues and ensure appointments to federal com-
mittees are “fairly balanced in terms of the points of view repre-
sented.”137 While the participation of NGOs as members of a policy Ad-
visory Council is limited and controlled by other governance actors, usu-
ally State delegations,138 such participation, when it does occur, can be 
quite influential.139 Indeed, these committees have often engaged in im-
portant international regulatory negotiations, also known as “reg-neg.” It 
has even been claimed NGO advisors determine much of World Bank 
policy.140 
The UN system of Working Groups is probably the best example of the 
involvement of NGOs in Advisory Councils. Working Groups are com-
missioned to review technical details of a proposal or provide informa-
tion and guidance in relationships with particular groups, including in-
digenous communities, women, children, and others.141 While these 
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ated rulemaking occurred under the auspices of the FACA). 
 140. See Citizen’s Groups: The Non-governmental Order, ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 1999, 
at 20, 21 (“From environmental policy to debt relief, NGOs are at the centre of World 
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 141. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Home-
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Working Groups operate outside the purview of official UN policy mak-
ing circles, they report to various UN committees and have substantial 
legitimacy.142 Membership on these Working Groups is therefore highly 
prestigious, especially since Working Groups are treated as insiders in 
the UN system, are accorded significant access privileges, and may wield 
significant power as expert bodies. The level of Working Group influ-
ence varies by committee and issue, but can be quite powerful and frame 
entire negotiation processes, formulate draft texts, or even reject negoti-
ated solutions.143 
In the case of Advisory Councils or training activities, the accountabil-
ity question is about who has the right to provide information or be 
treated as experts. There are also questions related to the quality of the 
information provided. All of these concerns tend toward issues of com-
petence, rather than issues of representation. Accordingly, participation 
in Advisory Councils represents a functionalist approach to international 
governance and must be cordoned through delegatory models of ac-
countability. 
For accountability purposes, this is the least problematic of the admin-
istrative functions an NGO may perform. Accountability concerns focus 
mainly around the production and content of information, ensuring the 
information is full, fair, and accurate.144 As such, training and informa-
tion is supposed to be largely objective, and concerns about representa-
tiveness are limited. More important is external accountability to the or-
ganization to ensure it is not misled by the NGO providing the informa-
tion. 
4. Service Provision 
Some authors have categorized NGOs partially by function, classifying 
them as operational- or advocacy-oriented.145 However, the classification 
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 144. See Wapner, supra note 50, at 203. 
 145. Leon Gordeneker & Thomas G. Weiss, Pluralizing Global Governance: Analyti-
cal Approaches and Dimensions, in NGOS, THE UN, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 36–40 
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of NGOs as operational is limited primarily to the deployment of ser-
vices.146 While the preceding sections have illustrated howNGO in-
volvement in the enforcement of international governance systems ex-
tends beyond the simple deployment of services, service provision by far 
constitutes the main avenue of NGO participation in the enforcement and 
furtherance of international governance systems.147 
NGOs are good actors in this capacity as they are generally more re-
sponsive to beneficiary needs than government institutions. However, 
they may be less accountable than government institutions in the delivery 
of those services.148 In fact, 
[i]t’s not as if there is a long list of parties able to deliver medical aid in 
Chechnya, or run refugee camps in Congo, or vaccinate children in 
southern Sudan. Whatever the rest of their political agendas, interna-
tional NGOs are often not only the best positioned to do these jobs, 
they are the only organizations with any possibility of doing them.149 
It is often argued NGOs are best able to provide development assis-
tance and non-profit services such as community health care and the 
management of natural resources150—especially for populations unable 
to pay since they do not fall neatly within any particular category ser-
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1704–08. 
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 149. Anderson, supra note 3, at 375. 
 150. See, e.g., Zadek & Gatward, supra note 102, at 229–39; Goodin, supra note 5, at 
3–4; J. Fisher, Is the Iron Law of Oligarchy Rusting Away in the Third World?, 22 
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viceable by the government.151 This view is generally held because self-
selection of personnel and NGO purpose statements serve to create or-
ganizations with officers having altruistic motivations, giving greater 
assurance they will carry out the provision of public goods and other 
public interested actions with less rent-seeking relative to other organiza-
tions.152 
However, when non-profits compete for public contracts with for-
profit entities, the competitive process may cause non-profits to act simi-
larly to for-profit entities.153 Despite this concern, “[s]ervice providers 
accrue government funding largely on the basis of client choices rather 
than on the basis of competitive tendering for contracts providing blocks 
of funding from government.”154 Additionally, when acting as contract 
agents, NGOs generally have performance requirements built into the 
public service contracts.155 This illustrates a distinct subject of account-
ability: results- or outcome-based accountability. Principal-agent ac-
countability issues are also raised when NGOs provide services. In such 
arrangements, NGOs are held externally accountable by the governments 
or international governmental organizations with whom they contract,156 
and by the beneficiaries who seek to ensure the services fulfill their 
needs, and internally accountable by their members, who determine the 
manner through which the services are provided. 
5. Other Administrative Functions 
NGOs might also perform other, more difficult to categorize, adminis-
trative functions. For instance, the World Conservation Monitoring Unit 
compiled State data on trade in endangered species and prepared reports 
regarding such data, implementing the Convention on International 
                                                                                                             
 151. See SMITH & LIPSKY, supra note 148, ch. 6. 
 152. See Goodin, supra note 5, at 21–22. 
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Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).157 Though taking a more involved 
administrative role, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN) has taken on similar duties. ICANN allocates and 
assigns internet space, manages top-level domain names (e.g., .com, .org, 
and other generic and country-code top level domains), and manages root 
servers. Although ICANN is largely considered the provision of private 
standards, domestic governments are involved in the process of establish-
ing the standards, thereby making the process a quasi-public-private 
partnership.158 Accountability for these administrative activities will de-
pend upon the functions performed, but is expected to be primarily based 
on external accountability controls to the regime, with minimal represen-
tational concerns or internal mechanisms needed. 
C. Enforcement 
While the involvement of NGOs in standard setting and general admin-
istrative duties of international organizations is currently relatively low 
(though likely to increase in the future), NGO involvement in the en-
forcement of established codes has been characterized as moderate in 
scope and nature.159 
1. Arbitration and Mediation 
Private arbitration is a major way international regimes are enforced. 
Many international treaties and regimes provide the opportunity for liti-
gants to pursue arbitration as either the sole remedy or one of a litany of 
potential remedies for violation of provisions of those instruments.160 The 
leading international arbitration organization providing for the settlement 
of these disputes is the International Centre for the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID),161 which is an “autonomous international organi-
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 159. See Doh & Guay, supra note 82, at 10 tbl.1. 
 160. See Joanne K. Leweler, International Commercial Arbitration as a Model for 
Resolving Treaty Disputes, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 379 (1989). 
 161. See generally Amazu A. Asouzu, African States and the Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards: Some Key Issues, 15 ARB. INT’L 1 (1999); Thomas L. Brewer, International 
Investment Dispute Settlement Procedures: The Evolving Regime for Foreign Direct 
Investment, 26 L. & POL’Y  INT’L BUS. 633 (1995); A. Giardina, ICSID: A Self-Contained, 
Non-National Review System, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
TOWARDS “JUDICIALIZATION” AND UNIFORMITY? 199 (R.B. Lillich & C.N. Brower eds., 
176 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 31:1 
 
zation” established by the World Bank through an international conven-
tion and comprised of World Bank Member States.162 However, other 
arbitral NGOs also serve to enforce international regimes. For instance, 
the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Court of Arbitra-
tion hears more than 500 new cases each year. Having heard over 12,000 
cases since its inception in 1923,163 the Court is responsible for hearing 
many of the arbitrations arising under the UN Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNCITRAL).164 Similarly, the American Arbitration 
Association, operating under the International Dispute Resolution Proce-
dures, also hears cases dealing with international governance issues.165 
Questions about accountability are particularly poignant when NGOs 
take on the role of mediating or arbitrating disputes. External account-
ability to the governance regime and NGO independence are important. 
Internal accountability or external accountability to its beneficiaries may 
be seen as biased and would be largely undesirable.166 However, some 
measure of external accountability to beneficiaries (and the regime itself) 
may be important in certain contexts where the governing rules require 
consideration of civil society’s participatory needs in dispute resolution. 
2. Monitoring 
Although untested,167 some claim under specific conditions, NGO lob-
bying and information provision can pressure norm-violating govern-
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ments into compliance.168 However, it is not clear whether NGOs under-
taking these approaches actually influence State behavior.169 While it has 
been noted most NGOs are not well-suited to serve as comprehensive 
and exclusive enforcement agents,170 NGOs have nevertheless been pro-
vided the authority in some regimes to act as enforcement agents where 
States are believed to have violated international rules.171 
For instance, under the Montreal Protocol, NGOs may act as enforce-
ment agents by notifying the Secretariat of non-conforming States, who 
in turn may sanction the non-conforming States.172 Although NGOs need 
not show injury to enforce the regime, they do not have substantive 
rights under the Montreal Protocol, and Parties must consent to NGO 
participation, limiting the effectiveness of NGO enforcement signifi-
cantly.173 Conversely, under a number of human rights regimes, NGOs 
are granted locus standi to enforce human rights instruments.174 As a re-
sult, “the regular provision of information by the [international NGO] 
community to various UN human rights committees and national gov-
ernments has not only greatly improved our knowledge about human 
rights violations, but also increased compliance with international human 
rights norms.”175 
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Other, weaker versions of NGO participation as monitoring and en-
forcement agents also exist. For instance, NGOs can participate in the 
WTO dispute settlement system through submission of amicus curiae 
briefs.176 Though this is a relatively weak method of enforcement, what 
is important about the WTO example is, in order to submit a brief, the 
organization must make clear its objectives, affiliations, funding sources, 
and plan for uniquely contributing to the resolution of the dispute.177 
Allowing NGOs to participate in the monitoring and enforcement of 
international regimes raises different accountability concerns than does 
the situation where an NGO acts as the mediator or arbitrator in a dispute 
concerning such violations. Similar to the previous discussion, NGOs 
must remain accountable to the regime itself, ensuring NGOs constrain 
their charges of States violating international norms to instances where 
the NGOs actually believe such violations to exist. More significant 
however, is the importance of NGOs to adequately represent those inter-
ests for which they claim to stand. If the enforcement scheme is designed 
to leave vindication of the rights of unrepresented or disempowered 
groups to NGOs, then it is essential NGOs be accountable to their bene-
ficiaries. Internal accountability in this circumstance is only marginally 
important to the proper functioning of the regime. 
The question then remains as it began: are NGOs sufficiently account-
able to the appropriate entities or populations? The following Part an-
swers this question generally in the negative and seeks to apply a func-
tion-based analysis to NGO accountability theory. 
IV. REFINING THE CRITIQUE: GUIDING NGO INVOLVEMENT 
The previous Part illustrated some of the distinct accountability con-
cerns related to particular functions performed by NGOs in international 
governance. This function-based approach to categorizing NGOs is not 
unique to this Article. Börzel and Risse categorize NGOs by function and 
their source of authority in international governance systems, noting 
NGOs can perform various functions within governance systems based 
upon cooptation, delegation, co-regulation, or self-regulation in the 
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shadow of hierarchy.178 This authority-based analysis is useful in under-
standing the context within which NGO governance functions occur. 
However, it is only useful in establishing accountability controls insofar 
as they assist policy makers in determining the needs and purposes of the 
organization itself. 
Although recognition of the source of authority may legitimate NGO 
involvement under some governance systems and not others, such a 
framework does not suggest differentiated accountability controls when 
the same function is performed across different governance systems. 
Rather, differentiation is a function of the overall regime needs and pur-
poses with respect to NGO participation and may significantly vary by 
type of governance regime. As a result, the authority-based analysis per-
formed by Börzel and Risse is part of a separate accountability analysis 
and should be treated as an addendum to, but not a replacement of, the 
framework established by this Article. This Part seeks to define some of 
the major issues and parameters involved in establishing a function-
based accountability control system. 
The UN system has the clearest and most direct method of ensuring the 
accountability of NGOs seeking to participate in governance activities.179 
The 1996 policy established under the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) grants “consultative status” to NGOs upon a demonstration 
of purpose and accountability.180 While this “consultative status” does 
not grant NGOs the right to participate in all functions of governance 
described above in Part III, the procedure used by ECOSOC to accredit 
participation is a useful starting point for a discussion of NGO account-
ability requirements. The ECOSOC procedures require NGOs to provide 
their charters, bylaws, financial statements, annual reports, sample publi-
cations, and explain how their participation will contribute to the goals of 
the UN.181 These requirements are needed to evaluate NGOs’ structure, 
internal (public) accountability, and external accountability through 
funding sources.182 From the application, ECOSOC determines which 
NGOs may participate, limiting involvement to those having expertise in 
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the particular matter.183 Once accredited, NGOs can maintain their “con-
sultative status” by submitting a four-page, double-sided report every 
four years.184 Though this requirement may be criticized as insufficient to 
ensure accountability, the consultative process generally enables interna-
tional organizations to assert external accountability controls on NGOs, 
thereby minimizing “non-cooperative behavior.”185 
While the UN procedures signify a step in the right direction, there are 
over 6,400 intergovernmental organizations with which NGOs might 
engage and very few of them have similar accountability procedures.186 
Additionally, the ECOSOC requirements “need to be reconsidered in 
light of the increasing number of NGOs.”187 While providing a good 
starting framework, the ECOSOC procedures do not deal with the many 
variations of international governance activities in which an NGO might 
participate and are limited to the very narrow “consultative status” akin 
to participation on the Advisory Councils discussed above in Part III.B.3. 
Furthermore, the ECOSOC procedures conflate internal accountability 
with external accountability to the beneficiaries of the NGO.188 While 
this creates a significant concern for some governance functions, it 
clearly demonstrates a failing of the ECOSOC procedures to separate 
their requirements based upon the functions performed by the NGO. For 
example, Advisory Councils are highly technocratic epistemic communi-
ties designed around expertise.189 It is therefore not clear why internal 
accountability or external accountability to beneficiaries is particularly 
important to performing the governance function. On the other hand, 
where “consultative status” implies the right to act as an observer and 
participant in UN policy making procedures, the necessity and appropri-
ateness of such representation is far greater. The ECOSOC procedures do 
not distinguish between these two types of NGOs in terms of qualifica-
tions to perform various governance functions, illustrating how account-
ability controls not tailored to function are simultaneously both over- and 
under-inclusive. 
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Although this Article proceeds primarily from an institutional perspec-
tive, similar issues are raised in network governance structures, since 
“network governance representation is at least partly defined in func-
tional terms.”190 Additionally, even in a network situation, 
the relationship between representatives and represented has to con-
form to norms that usually are established in an institutional framework 
. . . establish[ing] rules which determine the selection of representa-
tives, and [those institutions] have to create formal structures of com-
munication and control, in which rulers can be effectively hold [sic] ac-
countable for their decisions.191 
As a result, this Article agrees although the process may be somewhat 
distinct and the accountability needs of network governance structures 
somewhat different than traditional institutional governance structures, 
“from a normative point of view, institutional structures of governance 
are decisive for democratic legitimacy, and this holds true for network 
governance, too.”192 In fact, given “[g]overnance networks . . . serve as a 
corrective for deficits of the institutions,”193 creating distinctions in ac-
countability requirements for networks as opposed to institutions seems 
normatively suspect.194 
This Part seeks to assist international governance regimes in defining 
the universe of NGOs eligible to perform a particular governance func-
tion. It is not, however, intended to determine whether NGOs should per-
form a function or which particular NGO or NGOs should be selected to 
perform particular functions. “[T]he essential differences between vari-
ous types of NGO activity seem to warrant some kind of typology, some 
way of grouping NGOs by the functions they perform.”195 Grouping or-
ganizations by function “would, at a minimum, allow us to approach an 
individual NGO on its own terms, evaluating the particular organization 
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with regard to its specific purpose.”196 In evaluating NGOs for base ac-
countability purposes, three major types of accountability exist: (1) inten-
tions or purposes; (2) actions or competence; and (3) outcomes.197 Given 
the resource constraints and distance of international regimes from 
NGOs, this Article suggests accountability controls be established at both 
the international and national levels. 
A. Standardizing Procedures by Function 
At the national level, function-based accountability controls are espe-
cially crucial to achieving the appropriate level of NGO accountability. 
At the international level, this need is accentuated by the lack of institu-
tional regime capacity or experience in providing the ever-expanding 
range of international governance functions, necessitating the inclusion 
of NGOs and other non-State actors in international governance—a need 
less significant at the national level. As a result, there is no significant 
normative difference (putting aside the democratic deficit debate) be-
tween international and domestic governance to warrant different ap-
proaches to determining when accountability mechanisms should be ap-
plied. However, NGO participation in domestic governance may be far 
more limited in the scope of roles performed, making a function-based 
approach not economically feasible.198 
A function-based approach is particularly important for NGOs because, 
although it is assumed NGO officials are typically more altruistic than 
other governance actors (with the possible exception of government offi-
cials), “[domestic] non-profit corporate law is in any event unlikely in 
any jurisdiction to constrain NGO executives to the extent that public 
officials routinely are constrained by ethics legislation and regula-
tions.”199 While NGOs may have a lower starting baseline of account-
ability (given existing frameworks), this does not mean we should de-
mand greater total accountability of NGOs than of other governance ac-
tors. 
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As noted above, traditional theory relates the strength of accountability 
relationships to “the power of the entity being held accountable.”200 
While significantly different from the view of accountability in this Arti-
cle, its basic premise is implicitly applicable to the project set out here. 
In fact, “with respect to legitimacy, the nature of the issue may be an im-
portant factor in determining whether we care about procedures for ac-
countability.”201 If power is determined in part by function, as this Arti-
cle posits, then accountability controls and their strengths should be 
mapped to those functions. This section seeks to undertake such an ef-
fort, moving away from the mainstream literature which aligns account-
ability mechanisms with type of governance actor or regime.202 The fol-
lowing sections attempt to map broadly political-, administrative-, and 
enforcement-related functions to accountability controls analyzed by 
others. While greater specificity of the functions performed is likely nec-
essary to achieve a truly normatively justified accountability system, this 
Article seeks to serve as a starting point for such an analysis, leaving fur-
ther nuances and discussion for another time.203 
While this Article believes it exponentially preferable for domestic 
governments to undertake a harmonization process similar to the one 
described below in Part IV.B, where domestic governments do not utilize 
procedures sufficiently similar to those described, international govern-
ance regimes must do so in order to properly certify NGO participation 
and prevent favoritism to NGOs located in countries where such proce-
dures are followed. 
                                                                                                             
 200. Keohane, Commentary on the Democratic Accountability of Non-Governmental 
Organizations, supra note 67, at 479. 
 201. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 18. 
 202. See generally Kaldor, supra note 34; Keohane & Nye, supra note 5. 
 203. See supra Table 1. One danger in the approach of applying function-based ac-
countability controls at the micro-function level is someone must determine what controls 
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1. Political Functions 
As described above in Part III.A, NGOs have a very important role to 
play in policy formulation. It has been claimed “[t]ransnational actors 
who are not active participants in governance arrangements or negotiat-
ing systems [but merely lobby or perform advocacy functions] pose few 
challenges to existing concepts and theories in political science and in-
ternational relations.”204 Despite this claim, “policy-making accountabil-
ity” is still very important in international governance.205 As mentioned 
above, representation issues rightfully dominate the discussion concern-
ing NGO accountability in performing political activities.206 
Democratic accountability is important when NGOs perform political 
functions because they are acting in a representative function. Authority 
for NGO participation in policy formulation is often justified in terms of 
intrinsic rights to political participation.207 Although not all political 
functions are necessarily representative in nature, the overwhelming ma-
jority of NGOs involved in policy formulation claim to represent some 
interest, providing them with the legitimacy sufficient to justify partici-
patory rights.208 However, where such representation is crucial to achieve 
this legitimacy, assurance must be made the NGOs are properly repre-
sentative. This is important because if an NGO falsely claims to repre-
sent a group and is allowed to participate, the NGO may serve to dele-
gitimize or otherwise thwart the true representation of the group.209 Al-
though such representation need not be necessarily democratic in na-
ture—especially since democracy is not a universally accepted form of 
                                                                                                             
 204. Börzel & Risse, supra note 82, at 198. 
 205. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Public Participation in Consolidating De-
mocracies: Hungary and Poland, in BUILDING A TRUSTWORTHY STATE IN POST-SOCIALIST 
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 208. Michael Edwards, NGO Legitimacy—Voice or Vote ?, Feb. 2003, http://www. 
globalpolicy.org/ngos/credib/2003/0202rep.htm. See also David H. Moore, Agency Costs 
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RTS. L. REV. 261 (2004); Edwards, supra note 208. 
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governance—many international regimes do base their authority and par-
ticipatory requirements upon some modicum of democratic legitimacy.210 
The literature on democratic, or representational, accountability fo-
cuses on NGO representation of beneficiary interests, rather than upon 
member interests.211 While this Article acknowledges external account-
ability to beneficiaries is important where NGOs claim to represent bene-
ficiary interests, not all NGOs which provide services to beneficiary 
groups or act altruistically on behalf of third-parties claim to speak on 
behalf of those groups.212 Therefore, accountability controls related to the 
performance of political functions should be determined primarily by 
representation of the NGO’s internal membership. Representation of 
beneficiary groups is necessary when an NGO claims to represent the 
views of its beneficiaries; otherwise, representation requirements merely 
serve to decrease the participatory opportunities of otherwise qualified 
NGOs.213 As a result, under the democratic or representative model of 
governance authority, representational, hierarchical, and fiscal account-
ability controls are important to constrain NGO behavior in the perform-
ance of political functions.214 
Additionally, peer accountability mechanisms are fairly appropriate 
under situations where NGOs perform what might be considered political 
functions, since negotiated outcomes depend upon the willingness of par-
ticipants to enter into a meaningful negotiation process.215 These func-
tions are also most closely aligned with traditional state-state relations, 
which operate based upon balance of power constraints and are most re-
lated to peer accountability constraints in accountability theory. This is 
therefore relevant under theories considering “accountability as . . . re-
sponsiveness, obligation and willingness to communicate with others 
across the various agencies (the various government departments, quasi-
                                                                                                             
 210. While this Article conflates representative and democratic accountability for sim-
plicity’s sake and to align it more squarely with the existing literature on democratic ac-
countability, adequate representation of some form is crucial for most NGO participation 
in policy formulation. 
 211. See generally Wapner, supra note 50; Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participa-
tion: NGOs and International Governance, supra note 111. 
 212. NGO Monitor, Different Types of NGOs, http://www.ngo-monitor.org/ngo/types. 
htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2005). 
 213. See generally Blitt, supra note 209. 
 214. As noted above in Table 1, hierarchical controls are considered to include democ-
ratic or other representative accountability to members or beneficiaries (where explicitly 
stated). 
 215. See Wapner, supra note 50, at 202 (discussing the effects of NGO cooperation 
and coalitions on accountability). 
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governmental organizations and private contractors) constituting the 
relevant policy community responsible for the ‘joined-up government’ 
of, and service delivery in, that sphere.”216 However, peer accountability 
controls are only valid to the extent they identify failures to adequately 
represent member or beneficiary interests, and when peer organizations 
identifying such failures have the authority to present the regime with 
such information.217 Since peer accountability controls are typically out-
come-based, this type of control for the most part will be unacceptable to 
resolve issues of effective representation. 
From a regime perspective, then, NGO intentions should be the pri-
mary determinant of accountability controls which should be designed by 
reference to the NGO’s structure and ability to uphold its intentions. 
NGO intentions relate to the motives or purposes with which NGOs 
act.218 NGOs representing or claiming to represent particular interests 
must actually attempt to do so. Whether the NGO is able to fully repre-
sent the interests of its membership or beneficiary populations is another 
matter, though it certainly should be an ultimate goal. However, repre-
sentation need not be perfect in order to be legitimate.219 To determine an 
organization’s representativeness, then, the actual level of representa-
tiveness should be gauged against the NGO’s stated intentions to deter-
mine the veracity of their claims. 
2. Administrative Functions 
While intentions dominate accountability controls of NGOs performing 
political functions, actions (or competence) are most important for de-
termining accountability of NGOs undertaking administrative functions. 
The role of NGOs in performing administrative duties in international 
                                                                                                             
 216. Goodin, supra note 5, at 27 (quoting Mark Considine, The End of the Line? Ac-
countable Governments in the Age of Networks, Partnerships and Joined-Up Services, 15 
GOVERNANCE 21, 21 (2002)). 
 217. See Wapner, supra note 50, at 201. 
 218. Goodin, supra note 5, at 11. 
 219. A simple example from the United States political system demonstrates this: un-
der the “two-party system,” the United States’ political system is divided into two major 
groups based upon differing purposes of the two parties. It is axiomatic each member of 
each party does not adhere to every tenet of his or her party of choice. Instead, members 
align themselves with groups most closely resembling their own views or representing 
the interests which are of greatest importance to the members. Indeed, absolute represen-
tation of each member’s views would preclude effective organization. As a matter of 
pragmatism, therefore, imperfect representation must be sufficient to justify representa-
tion. The trickier question is determining when representation is not sufficiently represen-
tative of member or beneficiary interests or views. 
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governance is one primarily of functionality for the organization. Gener-
ally, a high level of technocratic expertise is required for such activities, 
and therefore, issues of representation are less significant.220 Instead, ex-
ternal accountability to the regime is most important from a regime per-
spective. 
NGO authority to participate as administrative governance actors is de-
rived from the privileges granted by the regime.221 NGOs and their repre-
sented memberships have no intrinsic rights to participate as administra-
tive actors. Rather, their participation serves instrumental purposes for 
the regime. As a result, NGO authority and legitimacy are derived from 
and delegated by the regime and can therefore be proscribed and with-
drawn by the regime.222 Adequate representation of members or benefici-
ary groups is therefore not a normative prerequisite to properly serving 
as an administrative agent of an international regime (assuming authority 
to perform such a function). 
Supervisory and legal accountability controls, derived from the power 
of delegation, are therefore the primary mechanisms used in ensuring 
accountability. Secondary means of ensuring external accountability to 
the regime are enforced through budgetary and other fiscal controls, hi-
erarchical controls for managers in their individual capacities, and to a 
certain extent, peer accountability controls where other NGOs are also 
involved in the provision of particular administrative duties.223 Internal 
accountability (necessary to ensure membership fees and other base 
revenue and organizational sources of power are not mismanaged or 
abused) to members is achieved not through representational account-
ability mechanisms, but through procedural controls to ensure fiscal 
(through membership exit and loss of membership fees) and hierarchical 
accountability.224 
Action-related accountability concerns dominate administrative ac-
tions.225 NGO actions are evaluated to ensure they do not exceed the 
scope of the mandate provided by the delegating authority.226 Outcome-
related concerns also exist, but are less significant in the performance of 
administrative functions, since action-related accountability concerns 
                                                                                                             
 220. See generally Goodin, supra note 5, at 23–30 (suggesting homogeny is not neces-
sary because the desire to acheive a negotiated outcome is enough to succeed). 
 221. Id. at 1. 
 222. Id. at 3. 
 223. Id. at 3–4. 
 224. Keohane, Political Accountability, supra note 5, at 15. 
 225. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 27. 
 226. See Goodin, supra note 5, at 11. 
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determine which qualified NGOs participate and require those NGOs to 
perform their assigned duties. Therefore, if the NGO is to produce 
documentation or training programs, outcome-oriented accountability 
mechanisms provide little additional guidance, since NGO authority is 
derivative and delegated and can be withdrawn if the NGO fails to meet 
the quality expectations of the regime. Nevertheless, a minimal level of 
outcome-related constraints should also be imposed to ensure NGOs 
produce well-researched neutral information, for instance. 
3. Enforcement Functions 
Different from both political and administrative functions, NGOs’ per-
formance as enforcers of the rules of an international regime is derived 
both from intrinsic rights and instrumental privileges.227 NGO participa-
tory rights may be delegated to NGOs by the international regime based 
upon reasons of expertise or such rights may be intrinsic to ensure re-
gime adherence to the rules established by the regime and its Member 
States.228 As a result of this bifurcated source of authority, NGOs may be 
held to account by multiple groups: the regime (including the regime’s 
beneficiaries if the regime acts outside its scope of authority), the benefi-
ciaries of the NGO, and, to a lesser extent, the internal membership of 
the NGO.229 
NGOs performing enforcement functions must maintain accountability 
to the regime and its purposes to ensure the regime is held to account and 
for the regime to ensure the NGOs act within the authority properly dele-
gated to them, depending upon the particular enforcement function. 
NGOs must also ensure accountability to the regime’s beneficiaries and 
the beneficiaries of the NGO, whether internal or external. Generally, 
however, external beneficiary interests will dominate, and therefore ade-
quate representation of such interests must be assured.230 External ac-
countability to beneficiaries, while predominantly achieved through the 
regime’s policies and supervisory mandates, must also be ensured 
through a modicum of hierarchical accountability to the beneficiaries 
directly, where such enforcement functions directly affect them. 
                                                                                                             
 227. For a discussion of how these rights and privileges interact, see Erik B. Bluemel, 
Separating Instrumental from Intrinsic Rights: Toward an Understanding of Indigenous 
Participation in International Rule-Making (forthcoming 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. (Fall 
2005)). 
 228. See Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Gover-
nance, supra note 111, at 276–77; Grant & Keohane, supra note 4, at 8. 
 229. Charnovitz, supra note 111, at 277–78. 
 230. Id. at 278–79. 
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While beneficiary accountability is primarily determined by intentions 
and actions, external accountability to the regime is determined mostly 
by reference to actions and performance outcomes, especially in the pro-
vision of services.231 Effectiveness, expertise, and experience are crucial 
determinants for outcome-based accountability controls. For delegated 
non-public service provision NGO functions, external accountability to 
the regime generally is ensured through outcome-oriented supervisory, 
legal, and fiscal controls.232 The basic internal accountability necessary 
to ensure managerial compliance is achieved through fiscal and hierar-
chical requirements established (in the framework of this Article) under 
domestic law, as will be discussed in the next section. 
B. Harmonizing Domestic Procedures 
National governments often have processes by which NGOs are estab-
lished and verified under domestic law. Recognizing this, it would be 
inefficient to require international governance regimes to duplicate do-
mestic requirements. Implicit legitimacy is often established through 
domestic government recognition of NGOs as legal entities.233 This le-
gitimacy, however, should not be taken for granted, since the interna-
tional regime may have interests which are not purely based upon the 
aggregation of interests of its member States.234 As a result, international 
regimes must validate the rigor with which the national governments ap-
ply their accreditation procedures, much as the NACEC evaluates the 
enforcement of national environmental laws under NAFTA, and apply 
more stringent requirements where necessary and appropriate.235 As a 
result, domestic procedures should be viewed as baseline requirements 
for participation in international governance, but should be appended 
with international requirements where necessary to ensure accountability 
appropriate to the governance function involved. 
The view of this Article is efficiency requires domestic governments to 
certify NGOs as legitimate actors with the international system focusing 
on legitimizing NGO involvement in particular international governance 
functions. However, where domestic governments do not have proce-
dures or an effective process of legitimizing NGOs, the international sys-
                                                                                                             
 231. See generally Charnovitz, supra note 106 (discussing examples of NGOs, issues 
arising from their involvment, and their functions). 
 232. See generally Grant & Keohane, supra note 4. 
 233. See Ann M. Florini, Lessons Learned, in THE THIRD FORCE: THE RISE OF TRANS-
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tem must do so to prevent unfairness between countries’ NGOs. This 
Article considers it highly desirable to harmonize the domestic NGO le-
gitimizing processes to both improve the effectiveness of the process 
itself and to conserve resources. This Article also considers domestic 
governments far superior in the basic legitimizing process given their 
proximity to the NGOs and their (typically) preexisting information col-
lection processes. Domestic governments are also most capable of under-
standing the variety of local organizational structures and purposes and 
therefore should play a central role in certifying NGOs as eligible for 
participation in international governance. 
However, establishing domestic accountability mechanisms for NGOs 
is no easy task considering the great variety in NGO organizational 
forms: 
[T]here are wide difference [sic] among NGOs concerning their forms 
of organisation—formal versus informal, hierarchy versus participa-
tion, networks versus federations, centralised versus decentralisation, 
not to mention differences in organisational culture. Some NGOs are 
membership organisations; others are governed by boards or trustees. 
Moreover, the meaning of membership varies.236 
Nevertheless, most national governments have, and continue to establish, 
requirements NGOs must meet to earn a particular, usually special, legal 
status.237 Of particular difficulty is the issue of distinguishing between 
local and international NGOs and determining what role national gov-
ernments might play in certifying such organizations.238 There are over 
200,000 local NGOs in the developing world alone.239 In addition, there 
are approximately 29,000 international NGOs.240 International NGOs 
often seek beneficiary legitimacy by allying with local NGOs and are 
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frequent sources of funds for their local partners.241 Thus, while interna-
tional NGOs may have greater legitimacy as actors at the international 
governance level, domestic NGOs have a significant role to play as well. 
Limiting participation to international NGOs may seriously undermine 
the funding and effectiveness of domestic NGOs, ultimately to the detri-
ment of local beneficiaries.242 Additionally, many, if not all, of the gov-
ernance functions described above in Part III could be performed by lo-
cal NGOs having the proper level of competence to perform such func-
tions. Therefore, this Article does not discount the participation of local 
NGOs in international governance as do the ECOSOC procedures.243 
However, this Article does recognize the difficulty in relying upon do-
mestic governments to certify international NGOs as potential partici-
pants in international governance.244 This Article favors (though by no 
means requires) an alliance between international NGOs and local NGOs 
to alleviate the disadvantages of limiting participation to either local or 
international NGOs, especially where beneficiary interests are repre-
sented and experience or expertise are important (as in the provision of 
services). 
In countries certifying NGOs, domestic accountability requirements 
generally require NGOs: (1) serve disempowered or underserved popula-
tions; (2) are established to promote the public interest; (3) are fiscally 
responsible so monies do not inure to private individuals; and (4) have an 
organizational structure holding its managers and directors accountable 
to its membership through some means.245 These basic requirements cre-
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ate a good base for establishing mechanisms to hold NGOs internally 
accountable when performing functions associated with international 
governance. However, “the absence of standard public law safeguards 
concentrates significant power in NGO secretariats” and may encourage 
forum shopping or a race-to-the-bottom in NGO domestic regulation.246 
Therefore, the following sections call for harmonization of domestic 
regulation of NGOs to ensure a minimum level of accountability. This 
minimum level of accountability is based upon the process of legitimiz-
ing NGOs as valid actors in any sphere of governance and includes the 
four accountability controls discussed above. 
1. Representation 
While domestic regimes generally require NGO service-orientation 
toward underserved or disempowered populations, this requirement is to 
ensure the NGO operates for a “public purpose,” rather than representa-
tion of beneficiary interests. Representation controls in this context 
should ensure members have some hold over policy decisions or agency 
leadership, such as occurs in a principal-agent relationship.247 Therefore, 
for harmonization purposes, accountability mechanisms should ensure 
only representation of member interests. External accountability to bene-
ficiaries is not necessary for all governance functions. Therefore, analy-
sis of accountability to beneficiaries, while best done at the domestic 
level, should not be a requirement harmonized prior to participation, but 
should be evaluated (by the domestic government) based upon the par-
ticular function the NGO seeks to perform. 
One criticism to this approach is rules governing NGO interactions 
with local communities can have significant positive consequences on 
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NGO relations with its beneficiaries.248 As NGO memberships are not 
usually comprised of NGO beneficiaries, it is important to differentiate 
NGO representativeness from NGO adherence to its intended beneficent 
goals as well as from representativeness of beneficiary views/desires, all 
of which may differ significantly. The disjuncture between the views and 
interests of intended beneficiaries and members can significantly impede 
the effectiveness of NGOs. While this is a sound criticism, it is valid 
only in relation to the organization’s purpose, claims to representative-
ness, or situations where NGO effectiveness can be decreased by the 
membership/beneficiary disjuncture. Therefore, it shall be discussed 
along with other NGO purposes below in Part IV.B.3. 
Although traditionally considered in the context of democratic ac-
countability akin to states, NGOs need not be highly representative of 
beneficiary interests to perform governance actions.249 Some have argued 
outcome-based measures should be more important than the representa-
tiveness of the NGO.250 However, this Article does not believe such gen-
eralizations are appropriate, and argues different accountability measures 
must be evaluated in light of the function the NGO seeks to perform, as 
discussed in greater detail in Part IV.A. 
While the requirement NGOs be non-profit entities helps ensure ac-
tions in the “public interest” to a certain extent, it has been recognized 
that NGOs still operate under a profit motive, despite being non-profit, 
and therefore may not be entirely representative of member views.251 It is 
improper to assume NGOs are no more than a mere aggregation of their 
memberships’ interests. Rather, bureaucratic theory suggests NGOs may 
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have public-interest values not derived from any interest-aggregation 
theory of representation.252 As a result, adequate member representation 
must be viewed in part in terms of process, and not wholly in terms of 
results, and must ensure the results are not contrary to the purpose of the 
NGO. 
Representativeness is difficult to verify,253 but local variations demand 
it be addressed at the local or national level as opposed to the interna-
tional level. Three indicators, however, may be a useful starting point in 
determining NGO representativeness: “the institutional ability of [mem-
bers] to sanction leaders, the de facto capacity of [members] to sanction 
leaders, and the [organization’s] responsiveness to the expressed will of 
the [members].”254 
2. Accountability 
At the international level, accountability of NGOs generally focuses on 
analyzing the democratic accountability of NGOs.255 However, other ac-
countability issues exist and are the dominant forms of control imposed 
at the domestic level. Because NGO self management and internal ac-
countability procedures are insufficient to guarantee NGO accountabil-
ity,256 various mechanisms to improve internal NGO management have 
been proposed.257 Therefore, despite the fact NGOs can be held account-
able to their members through member exit, financial conditionality re-
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quirements, advisory boards,258 and other externally-imposed account-
ability requirements are often deemed desirable from a national policy 
perspective. 
Specifically, financial accountability controls are used to ensure fiscal 
responsibility of the organization so self-serving “for-profit” personal 
motives do not exist.259 Hierarchical accountability controls are used to 
further constrain NGO managers and employees from inappropriate ac-
tions and rent-seeking behavior. For this reason, the method of board 
selection is important to NGO accountability.260 Both fiscal and hierar-
chical controls are more readily obtained and verified at the national 
level as opposed to the international level. Therefore, requiring controls 
at the national level in the first instance may make economic sense. 
3. Validity of Proffered Goals 
Another issue best harmonized at the domestic level is the requirement 
that NGOs serve the “public interest.” Definitions regarding the “public 
interest” will certainly vary by state. In fact, not all States define NGOs 
as non-profit entities.261 Since “moral accountability arises from the mis-
sion of the civil society actor,”262 it is important to ensure the legitimacy 
derived from an organization’s NGO status is justified. The requirement 
NGOs be non-profit entities serves in part to ensure NGOs serve, or in 
some cases represent, marginalized interests imperfectly serviced or rep-
resented by the State. In this sense, some NGOs serve a “second-best” 
                                                                                                             
 258. Wapner, supra note 50, at 201–02 (“Many professional institutions use outside 
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 261. See, e.g., Felicidad Soledad, Accountability as a Sector: The PCNC Experience, 
in CSRO ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 260, at 9 (noting the Philippines did not certify 
NGOs for tax deduction purposes until recently). 
 262. Kaldor, supra note 34, at 21. 
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function of representation or service-provision.263 However, the legiti-
macy of distinguishing between NGOs serving underserved populations 
and NGOs serving more politically powerful associations is normatively 
suspect. Failure to limit the participation of these more powerful NGOs, 
however, means increasing NGO participation generally may in fact fur-
ther disempower underrepresented groups as they must then battle 
against potential capture of organizations by more powerful NGOs.264 
As a result, it is important to link the international regime’s goals of 
NGO participation to the purpose with which the NGO is formulated. 
The purpose of the NGO is important not only to determine which NGOs 
are actually serving the public interest but also to ensure NGO institu-
tional competence in particular fields.265 Relationships with marginalized 
populations on specific issues creates a measure of competence impor-
tant to proper international governance. Although one society may be 
comprised of marginalized populations which are politically powerful in 
other societies, this variation does not overcome the significant need to 
establish a harmonized approach to tackling the issue of NGO purpose to 
determine whether organizations act for the public-interest or private 
profit.266 
4. Veracity of Proffered Goals 
Harmonizing domestic requirements for initial NGO certification is in-
sufficient, however, to ensure NGOs are appropriately accountable and 
formulated at the domestic level. Without a requirement NGOs be evalu-
ated for the veracity of their goals and the imposition of other account-
ability controls, it will be difficult to weed out NGOs which serve as 
mere fronts for states seeking increased political power or organizations 
misrepresenting their purposes or engaging in other fraudulent rent-
seeking behavior. 
                                                                                                             
 263. See Ngaire Woods, Good Governance in International Organizations, GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE, Jan.–Mar. 1999, at 39, 45. 
 264. See Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, The Club Model of Multilateral Coop-
eration and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in POWER AND GOVERNANCE IN A 
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263. 
 265. Goodin, supra note 5, at 25. This, of course, assumes application of the UN’s 
definition of NGO. See supra note 2. 
 266. This is not to say that industry or for-profit associations have no right to partici-
pate in international governance. However, this Article is limited to an analysis of NGOs, 
as defined by the UN. 
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It has been argued, relative to other actors, intentions play a much 
greater role in ensuring accountability of the non-profit sector and re-
gimes should continue to focus on the intentions of NGO actors, moni-
toring NGO intentions undertaken through peer accountability mecha-
nisms.267 Despite these claims for the greater use of peer accountability 
in holding NGOs to account to their purposes,268 fly-by-night NGOs have 
not been successfully regulated through internal codes of conduct or peer 
accountability controls.269 
Instead, requirements at the national level help validate NGO actions 
against the purposes with which they are established and are therefore 
important to ensure long-term NGO accountability and public-interest 
oriented behavior. As noted above, NGOs in international governance 
often do not disclose or are not required to disclose their funding 
sources.270 International validation of domestic data is therefore neces-
sary to ensure the veracity of the data collected and NGOs are not merely 
State funded or controlled organizations. The continued requirement of 
financial accountability is also important to ensure the organization does 
not engage in for-profit activities. However, determining whether an 
NGO has faithfully adhered to its mission and vision can be a difficult 
task.271 
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Often, formal means are lacking to ensure organizations are meeting 
their stated objectives.272 This issue may also be exacerbated by financial 
conditionality, which may not perfectly align with stated objectives and 
goals.273 In fact, issues of multiple accountability often make coherent 
management difficult.274 Establishing accreditation procedures at the in-
ternational governance level may serve to streamline multiple account-
ability concerns into a single accountability source. This may occur as 
donors adopt the accreditation procedures used by international regimes, 
thereby minimizing conflicting accountability concerns and loyalties sig-
nificantly. While loyalty issues surrounding financing will likely inevita-
bly occur given donor financing preferences, accreditation procedures 
may be used to ensure only those organizations with goals appropriately 
aligned with such donor preferences will be financed, rather than allow-
ing NGOs to constantly redefine their priorities to meet donor demands. 
One concern with such an arrangement, however, is donor financing 
may be given even greater power under such an arrangement. Only those 
NGOs whose goals are aligned with donor preferences will receive fund-
ing for participation in international governance activities.275 NGOs 
which could normally receive financing upon a redefinition of their goals 
may be left without funds, causing some populations or issues to go un-
served. Whereas these NGOs might have been able to incorporate some 
of their preferences into a donor-driven project previously and at least to 
some extent servicing those populations or issues, now those NGOs 
would be precluded from doing so in the international governance con-
text. Although not precluded from doing so in an informal, non-
governance context, international donors may adopt the accreditation 
procedures of international regimes throughout all of their financing ar-
rangements, thereby running the risk such a policy might result in sub-
                                                                                                             
 272. See Johnson, supra note 248. 
 273. See id. at 5. 
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optimal financing of various populations’ needs. The danger accredita-
tion procedures will limit the servicing of various issues, however, seems 
overstated, as many NGOs pursue multiple objectives simultaneously 
and even under very strict donor financing arrangements and still find 
means to adapt the donor requirements to meet the needs of both the 
NGO and the intended beneficiaries.276 
In the end, for NGOs to be held accountable in a coherent and consis-
tent manner at the international governance level, some harmonization in 
definition and regulation at the national level is required. NGOs have a 
sense of moral legitimacy due to their focus on public interest or non-
profit issues. It is therefore important for national governments to ensure 
an organization seeking NGO certification meet some requirements to be 
labeled a non-profit organization, including purpose- and population-
based requirements, financial and hierarchical accountability controls, 
and controls ensuring alignment between the purposes and actions of the 
organization. These mechanisms together establish the minimum re-
quirements necessary to create some coherency to NGOs in the interna-
tional sphere, thereby reducing the costs and improving the correctness 
of international governance systems’ certification of NGO participants. 
C. Implementation Issues 
This is a theory-based Article, leaving most of the details of implemen-
tation to further study. However, some general implementation concerns 
should be noted. 
1. Cost 
The ability to implement a unified system of NGO certification unique 
to each regime’s mandates and purposes will inevitably impose a number 
of significant costs. While some of these costs may be minimized 
through economies of scale if performed by a single certification organi-
zation,277 they will nevertheless be significant for international regimes. 
These costs may be borne by applicant NGOs, depending upon the re-
gime mandate, making distributional inequities a danger. Despite this 
potential pitfall, these concerns do not appear particularly worrisome 
since significant funding is available from various organizations to sup-
port NGO capacity-building and participation in international govern-
                                                                                                             
 276. See Johnson, supra note 248, at 14–15 (noting such flexibility is enhanced by 
requirements seeking greater incorporation of intended beneficiaries in the decisionmak-
ing processes but some ambiguity is still necessary to allow such flexibility). 
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ance.278 Additionally, this Article seeks to place some of the costs of im-
plementing this framework upon national governments, which typically 
have greater resources for certification than international regimes.279 
2. Feasibility 
a. Regime Perspective 
From a regime perspective, implementing the framework laid out 
might not only impose costs, but might be difficult to achieve even ab-
sent financial constraints. Lack of adequate data or resources to verify 
the veracity of organizations may present significant challenges in im-
plementation. Recognition of these problems is the primary reason why 
this Article suggests a two-tiered approach to certification: domestic- and 
international-level procedures. However, despite these data gaps, it is 
important to provide the indicators by which future studies may be con-
ducted and to identify areas of further research. 
Additionally, international regimes may not be particularly competent 
in certifying NGOs to participate, as most have not undertaken such cer-
tification requirements. As a result, a significant learning curve and pro-
ceduralization of the certification process will be required to guide re-
gime behavior. While a dedicated, independent certification agency may 
significantly assist regimes in this process,280 this learning curve will 
nevertheless exist and may present significant short-term equity and jus-
tice concerns. 
Finally, significant concerns exist regarding the ability of international 
organizations to pierce through domestic regulations serving as mere 
window dressing. This Article assumes such a process is possible, as it 
has faith in the approach undertaken by NACEC in the NAFTA regime. 
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ment Facility Small Grants Programme provides up to $50,000 for NGOs seeking to 
build their capacity in international governance as it relates to environmental protection. 
See The Global Environment Facility Small Grants Programme 1992–2002, Hands-on 
Actions for Sustainable Development (2002), http://sgp.undp.org/download/SGP10) 
yearReport.pdf. 
 279. Cf. Peel, supra note 176, at 74 (“Greater institutional constraints in the interna-
tional setting may mean that tribunals do not have the resources to devote to screening 
individual applications and submissions by NGOs. However, such considerations do not 
dictate the exclusion of NGOs from the international environmental dispute resolution 
processes altogether. Rather, they suggest the need for development of a process of ac-
crediting NGOs in the international environmental arena to ensure an empirical basis for 
determining their claimed representativeness and expertise.”). 
 280. See infra Part IV.C.5. 
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This Article counsels for freedom of information laws to the extent they 
provide information regarding government funding and NGO purposes, 
structures, and funding sources. Nevertheless, the difficulty of determin-
ing whether an organization is a mere political arm of a state where such 
laws do not exist will be immense, and without greater standardization, 
including the use of standard accounting procedures, data gathered from 
national governments or independently may require significant analysis 
to decipher their importance. 
b. NGO Perspective 
From the NGO perspective, the requirements imposed by this Article 
will likely undermine organizational efficiency to a certain extent. While 
this Article does not advocate significantly different accountability 
mechanisms than current literature, it does call for particular arrange-
ments of accountability mechanisms, the strength of which may vary de-
pending upon the functions performed (or the type of organization per-
forming them). As a result, certain combinations of accountability 
mechanisms may prove to be more stringent and hinder organizational 
efficiency to a greater extent than existing requirements or theories. As a 
result, such requirements might limit the number of NGOs capable of 
performing governance activities to the larger NGOs capable of absorb-
ing such additional costs.281 In the view of this Article, these concerns do 
not seem particularly compelling as an argument to reject a function-
based approach to accountability, but certainly must be considered in 
determining the strengths of accountability mechanisms applied to par-
ticular governance functions. 
3. Western Bias 
A significant concern for this framework is its potential to favor West-
ern forms of organization. While the departure from democratic account-
ability theory opens the door for participation by non-Western NGOs 
possibly left out of other accountability theories, the certification process 
established by this Article’s framework nevertheless may create a poten-
tial bias against non-Western organizational forms which are not estab-
lished according to the typically Western corporate model. Additionally, 
this Article continues to rely on representation as being a normative basis 
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for internal, and to some extent, external accountability to beneficiaries. 
While less concerning than mainstream accountability theory, which 
primarily relies upon democratic representation models and elections, 
this Article’s reliance on representation might be seen to imply a democ-
ratic model—an issue of concern since only approximately sixty percent 
of global society is democratically governed through elections.282 How-
ever, this analysis does not assume such a requirement unless one is es-
tablished at the regime level. 
As noted in the previous section, the certification requirements im-
posed by this framework might also favor wealthier NGOs, typically 
from Western or Northern countries.283 Even more disconcerting to some 
might be the departure from typical accountability critiques of NGOs, 
which disclaim NGOs’ failure to adequately represent their beneficiaries’ 
interests. Focus on internal accountability as accountability to members, 
who are typically wealthy Northern individuals and organizations, might 
advantage Northern policies. Southern countries may therefore oppose 
general increases in NGO power,284 out of fear Northern NGOs’ policy 
goals will not sync with local developing country realities, and may be 
coterminous with Northern governments’ policy platforms.285 Addition-
ally, Southern countries may fear allowing NGO participation will favor 
Northern NGOs due to inequities in power, access to technology and re-
sources, and the predominance of the English language in international 
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governance.286 This fear, however, is not particularly significant, as the 
theoretical framework established by the Article would actually reduce 
the number of Northern NGOs claiming to represent Southern benefici-
ary interests where such beneficiaries are not properly represented in 
NGO policymaking,287 spurring the formation of Southern NGOs or 
Northern NGOs truly representative of Southern interests. Additionally, 
this Article posits it is the responsibility of the regime itself to ensure full 
and fair representation of all affected interests, so failure to ensure fair-
ness in representation would be a shortfall of the regime, not of the 
NGOs. 
Finally, the certification requirements established under this Article run 
the risk of privileging particular organizational forms. Requiring NGOs 
to conform to a particular organizational structure, while perhaps making 
them more easily verified and held to account, risks undermining cultural 
forms of organization and hierarchy, as well as the overall effectiveness 
of various organizations.288 Internal accountability structures vary sig-
nificantly by culture and must be weighed against local custom. Interna-
tional regimes seeking to validate domestic non-profit legal structures 
should not demand particular organizational forms, but should evaluate 
the appropriateness of domestic legal non-profit structures against the 
reasoning used by domestic governments. Therefore, while harmoniza-
tion of domestic procedures is important in this context, it is also impor-
tant to allow for local variation.289 In applying context-dependent ac-
countability controls, therefore, formalism can be the enemy of the 
good.290 
One major obstacle is the requirement that NGOs be non-profit, which 
may require some states to redefine their tax codes, thereby contravening 
the will of the populace. Since the UN requires participating NGOs to be 
non-profit, this Article assumes this issue has not presented significant 
distributional equity problems, though it recognizes such concerns can 
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exist and should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis to ensure fair 
treatment across national borders. 
4. Moral Hazard 
There is potential concern the proceduralization of NGO participation 
in international governance might create a presumption of NGO account-
ability. This presumption, in turn, might lead some actors to give more 
credence to NGO positions than to other governance actors, such as 
states or other less procedurally governed entities. This concern is espe-
cially acute in enforcement situations where NGOs hold international 
governance regimes accountable. These NGOs might be less inclined to 
evaluate the regimes’ performance (in holding the regime accountable) if 
NGOs are participating in the structure, even when the NGO is not acting 
as an accountability control to unwieldy regime power. This is a potential 
concern, but one easily avoided through clear and simple certification 
procedures which outline the exact reasons and functions the NGO is 
allowed to perform. 
Another moral hazard concern might present itself with respect to do-
mestic certification requirements, whereby international regimes might 
presume domestically certified NGOs are proper participants in interna-
tional governance and therefore over-include NGOs in the governance 
regime. These dangers, however, appear to be insignificant where proce-
duralization is designed to ensure greater accountability. Although for-
malization may increase legitimacy without increasing accountability, 
the system proposed by this Article is intended to ensure accountability 
and thereby avoid this problem. 
5. Regime Accountability 
Finally, significant concerns exist regarding overall regime account-
ability. Allowing the international regime to hold the NGO accountable 
or require particular mechanisms places strong power in the hands of the 
regime to dispel criticism by not accrediting NGOs with views critical of 
the regime. As has been noted before, real power is held by those who 
accredit the participating NGOs.291 Some have taken the position greater 
inclusion is better, and therefore providing certification power to interna-
tional regimes might increase their ability to restrict NGO participation 
to only weak or already co-opted organizations: “[i]f NGOs are to be 
held accountable to intergovernmental organizations, controlled ulti-
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mately by governments, their most outstanding virtue—independence 
from governmental authority—would be threatened.”292 However, I do 
not share the conclusion this danger is so large as to warrant the applica-
tion of external accountability only through peer and reputational ac-
countability mechanisms.293 
While many NGOs do act through NGO networks, this is an issue 
separate from governance; peer accountability mechanisms are subject to 
failure through collusion, and normatively, NGOs not involved in gov-
ernance have no or limited normative right to hold other NGOs account-
able.294 Additionally, reputational mechanisms, highly dependent upon 
the provision of perfect information, are likely to be more effective in 
ensuring internal NGO accountability to members than external account-
ability to beneficiaries, who are in a dependent situation. That is, donors 
may cease or reduce their donations to organizations, but so long as the 
organizations still have funding, it is likely the assistance such organiza-
tions seek to provide will not be significantly rejected by beneficiaries. 
In the governance context, however, this is a non-issue, since NGOs 
would be authorized to act under a contract to provide services on behalf 
of the regime, so controls other than reputational mechanisms would be 
applicable to hold NGOs accountable to beneficiaries under such circum-
stances. In a governance setting, NGOs are not necessarily weak actors 
and therefore accountability controls previously asserted as sufficient in 
the private NGO context are no longer so.295 
As a result of this Article’s reluctance to rely upon peer accountability 
controls, the framework proposed suggests the international regime be 
involved in ensuring NGO accountability to the regime. These concerns 
are significant in the context of holding the regime to account for its ac-
tions, but less so where the NGO is performing governance functions on 
behalf of the regime. Nevertheless, the concern of cooptation, although 
not significantly increased by this Article’s framework over the status 
quo method of including NGOs, does counsel for the creation of an inde-
pendent accreditation organization. This reviewing body would be based 
upon a pool of actors and should include, at a minimum, one standing, 
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independent member of the accreditation organization, one member of 
the international regime to which the NGO applied for participation in its 
governance activities, and an official from the country where the NGO’s 
headquarters or field office is located, whichever is most pertinent to the 
particular issue and international organizational mission. This reviewing 
body should dispel most of the concerns associated with NGO cooptation 
and regime rent-seeking behavior. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has reviewed accountability theories related to NGO in-
volvement in international governance and found such theories lack pre-
cision and clarity and have proven to be overly general. NGOs may per-
form two major roles in governance: serving to act as accountability 
checks on international governance regimes or performing governance 
functions on behalf of those regimes. This Article focused primarily on 
the latter of the two roles, describing in detail in Part III some of the var-
ied functions NGOs have performed in international governance regimes. 
Deconstructing NGO participation in international governance reveals 
different accountability concerns are raised by the different functions 
performed by NGOs. As a result, accountability theory must recognize 
these differences and seek to apply controls based on the particular func-
tions performed by NGOs. Part IV provides a starting point for such a 
function-based accountability theory. While a function-based framework 
may present some significant implementation challenges for international 
and domestic regimes, from both a normative and efficiency perspective, 
such an approach is highly desirable because it avoids over- and under-
inclusion of NGOs in governance and ensures greater competition be-
tween NGOs for the performance of particular functions, allowing inter-
national regimes to select the NGO best fit to perform the particular 
function. These implementation challenges warrant further study to detail 
the contours of a function-based accountability theory and to illustrate 
methods of determining the optimal balance between organizational and 
institutional costs and ensuring suitable levels of accountability to the 
appropriate individuals or entities. 
